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Introduction - The Impact of
Immigration and Digitalization on
Labour Markets and Social Relations
This dissertation consists of three chapters studying global trends in the world of labour
markets and social relations. Two of the chapters use the refugee immigration wave in
Germany, 2014-2016, as a natural experiment. The first paper takes a local perspective,
investigating the areas around refugee shelters in Berlin. These areas have experienced
a decline in perceived neighbourhood quality, as represented by real estate prices and
by ratings on an online review site. At the same time, there was increased support for
right-wing parties. In the second, I show the effect of aggregate refugee immigration
on labour market regions in Germany. Employment and GDP have benefited from the
immigration wave, due to the additional demand generated by refugees. The third paper
is a cautionary look at the digitalization of labour relations - my coauthor Milena Petrova
and I use data from an online labour market to show how the reputation mechanism can
fail to incentivize seller effort when the returns to reputation fluctuate.
The dissertation is mainly empirical in nature. I use a variety of different data sources -
administrative and aggregated data, as well as rich datasets from online platforms. Com-
mon to all three chapters is the attempt to find novel natural experiments in observational
data. In the chapter on local labour markets, I exploit local policy differences and infras-
tructure constraints to construct new instrumental variables, creating exogenous variation
in local immigration. The other chapter on immigration is equally careful to establish
the exogeneity of refugee shelter locations. And in the third chapter, we show that it is
seasonal variation in the value of reputation, rather than for example seller characteristics
and selection, that systematically induce undesirable outcomes.
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The abstracts of the three papers are the following:
Refugee shelters, Neighbourhood Quality and Electoral Out-
comes in Germany
Does refugee immigration affect the perceived quality of neighbourhood amenities, and is
this an important factor for the opposition to immigration? In this paper, I use real estate
listings and online reviews of businesses and public places to demonstrate neighbourhood
change due to the establishment of a refugee shelter. The setting is Berlin during the
European refugee crisis of 2015. Local authorities had to scramble to find suitable loca-
tions for refugee shelters; I show that these locations did not differ from control locations
in terms of real estate prices, online reviews or political outcomes before immigration.
When a shelter was established, rental prices and ratings for existing places declined in
the immediate vicinity. Additionally, I show that the anti-immigrant German AfD party
received a higher share of the vote near the refugee shelters. However, these effects are
relatively small, and the measured decline in perceived neighbourhood quality explains
at most a third of the effect of shelters on voting outcomes (an alternative mechanism
could be the increased salience of the continent-wide crisis in the affected areas). The
effect on rental prices and ratings is also very local, while the effect on voting outcomes
is significant even at a greater distance.
The Demand Effect of Immigration: Refugees and Em-
ployment in Germany
The 2014-2015 refugee crisis led to a sharp and unexpected increase in immigration to
Germany, particularly from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. While as of 2017 few of the
immigrants have found employment, refugees receive social security payments and ac-
cess local services in the areas where they settle. The arrival of refugee immigrants in a
community therefore represents an unexpected demand shock. I exploit the fact that set-
tlement of refugees in Germany was managed to create novel instruments for the arrival
of refugees in a given region. Firstly, German federal states used different rules for the
internal allocation of refugees, and secondly, the availability of vacant housing was an
7
important factor. I find that immigration increased native employment growth by about 6
percent annually between 2014 and 2017; these gains are just as high for non-university
educated workers and occur especially in the service sectors most likely to benefit from
the demand shock. Despite this, I find some evidence that refugee immigration has led to
increased electoral support for the anti-immigration AfD party.
Reputational Incentives under Heterogeneous Demand Fluc-
tuations
Using data from an online home services marketplace, we study reputational incentives
in an environment with heterogeneous seller demand fluctuations. Our strategy exploits
the fact that some professionals work in highly seasonal occupations, while others do
not. We show that sellers facing an upcoming demand downturn become less likely to
receive a positive review, and we argue that this is because they value their reputations
less and exert lower effort. Robustness checks rule out several other explanations for this
phenomenon, e.g. reverse causality, selection of sellers into jobs or differences in the cost
of seller effort. Neither the economic literature nor the platforms relying on reputation
systems have sufficiently considered seller heterogeneity and the optimal way to account
for it in the information given to the buyer and in seller incentives.
8
Introduction - L’impact de
l’immigration et de la numérisation sur
les marchés du travail et les relations
sociales
Cette thèse est composé de trois chapitres consacrés à l’étude des tendances mondiales
dans les marchés du travail et les relations sociales. Les deux premiers chapitres se basent
sur la vague d’immigration de réfugiés en Allemagne, 2014-2016, comme expérience na-
turelle. Le premier article adopte une perspective locale et examine les zones autour des
abris de réfugiés à Berlin. Ces zones ont connu une baisse de la qualité perçue du quartier,
représentée par les prix de l’immobilier et par les notations sur un site d’évaluation en
ligne. A cette même période, le soutien aux partis de droite a augmenté. Dans le deuxième
article, je montre l’effet de l’immigration de réfugiés sur les marché du travail en Alle-
magne. L’emploi et le PIB ont profité de la vague d’immigration, en raison de la demande
supplémentaire générée par les réfugiés. Le troisième article, coécrit avec Milena Petrova,
porte un regard d’avertissement sur la numérisation des relations de travail. Grâce aux
données provenant d’un marché du travail en ligne, nous montrons que le mécanisme de
la réputation n’incite pas toujours les vendeurs à fournir l’effort nécessaire, en particulier
lorsque leurs rendements fluctue.
Cette thèse est principalement de nature empirique. J’utilise une variété de sources de
données - des données administratives et agrégées, ainsi que de riches ensembles de don-
nées provenant de plates-formes en ligne. Chacun des trois chapitres permet de chercher
des nouvelles expériences naturelles dans les données d’observation. Dans le chapitre
sur les marchés du travail locaux, j’utilise les différences de politique locale et les con-
traintes d’infrastructure pour construire de nouvelles variables instrumentales, créant une
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variation exogène de l’immigration locale. Le premier chapitre sur l’immigration est tout
aussi prudent pour établir l’exogénéité des lieux d’abris pour réfugiés. Dans le troisième
chapitre, nous montrons que ce sont les variations saisonnières de la valeur de la réputa-
tion, plutôt que par exemple les caractéristiques et la sélection des vendeurs, qui induisent
systématiquement des résultats indésirables.
Les résumés des trois articles sont les suivants:
Abris de réfugiés, qualité du quartier et résultats électoraux
en Allemagne
L’immigration de réfugiés affecte-t-elle la qualité perçue des commodités du quartier
et s’agit-il d’un facteur important pour l’opposition à l’immigration? Dans cet article,
j’utilise des listes de biens immobiliers et des évaluations en ligne d’entreprises et de lieux
publics pour mettre en évidence les changements de quartier dus à la création d’un abri
pour réfugiés. Ce papier se focalise sur la situation de Berlin lors de la crise des réfugiés
en Europe en 2015. Les autorités locales ont dû se démener pour trouver des emplace-
ments convenables pour les abris de réfugiés; Je montre que ces emplacements ne dif-
fèrent pas des emplacements de contrôle en termes de prix de l’immobilier, d’évaluations
en ligne ou de résultats politiques avant l’immigration. Lors de la mise en place d’un abri,
les prix de location et les évaluations des lieux existants ont baissé dans les environs im-
médiats. De plus, je montre que le parti politique allemand anti-immigrés AfD a obtenu
une plus grande part du vote aux alentours des abris de réfugiés. Cependant, ces effets
sont relativement faibles et le déclin mesuré de la qualité perçue du quartier explique au
plus un tiers de l’effet des abris sur les résultats du vote (un mécanisme alternatif pour-
rait être la visibilité accrue de la crise à l’échelle du continent dans les zones touchées).
L’effet sur les prix de location et les évaluations est également très local, tandis que l’effet
sur les résultats du vote est significatif même à grande distance.
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L’effet de l’immigration sur la demande: réfugiés et em-
ploi en Allemagne
La crise des réfugiés de 2014-2015 a entraîné une augmentation forte et inattendue de
l’immigration en Allemagne, en particulier en provenance de Syrie, d’Irak et d’Afghanistan.
Bien que, en 2017, peu d’immigrés aient trouvé un emploi, les réfugiés reçoivent des
paiements de sécurité sociale et ont accès aux services locaux dans les zones où ils
s’installent. L’arrivée d’immigrants réfugiés dans une communauté représente donc un
choc inattendu de la demande. L’installation de réfugiés en Allemagne a été contrôlée
par les autorités, ce qui me permet de créer de nouveaux instruments statistiques pour
l’arrivée de réfugiés dans une région donnée. Premièrement, chaque état fédéré allemand
utilisait des règles différentes pour la distribution interne des réfugiés et, deuxièmement,
la disponibilité de logements vacants était un facteur important. Dans cet article, je mon-
tre que l’immigration a accru la croissance de l’emploi des autochtones d’environ 6%
par an entre 2014 et 2017; ces gains étant tout aussi importants pour les travailleurs non
universitaires et se produisant en particulier dans les secteurs des services les plus suscep-
tibles de bénéficier du choc de la demande. Malgré cela, cet article fournit des preuves
que l’immigration de réfugiés a conduit à un soutien électoral accru au parti AfD anti-
immigration.
Incitation de la réputation en cas de fluctuations hétérogène
de la demande
En utilisant des données provenant d’un marché de services à domicile en ligne, nous
étudions l’importance de la réputation dans un environnement caractérisé par des fluc-
tuations hétérogènes de la demande des vendeurs. Notre stratégie exploite le fait que
seule une partie des professionnels occupent des emplois très saisonniers. Nous montrons
que les vendeurs confrontés à un ralentissement de la demande imminent ont moins de
chances de recevoir un avis positif. Nous affirmons que cela est dû au fait qu’ils attachent
moins d’importance à leur réputation et exercent un effort plus faible. Les contrôles de
robustesse excluent plusieurs autres explications de ce phénomène, par exemple celle de
la causalité inverse, de la sélection des vendeurs dans des emplois particuliers, ou de dif-
férences dans le coût associé aux efforts du vendeur. Ni la littérature économique ni les
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plates-formes reposant sur des systèmes de réputation n’ont suffisamment pris en compte
le rôle de l’hétérogénéité des vendeurs ainsi que le moyen optimal de la transmettre dans
les informations fournies aux acheteurs et vendeurs.
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Chapter 1
Refugee shelters, Neighbourhood
Quality and Electoral Outcomes in
Germany
Does refugee immigration affect the perceived quality of neighbourhood amenities, and is this an
important factor for the opposition to immigration? In this paper, I use real estate listings and
online reviews of businesses and public places to demonstrate neighbourhood change due to the
establishment of a refugee shelter. The setting is Berlin during the European refugee crisis of
2015. Local authorities had to scramble to find suitable locations for refugee shelters; I show that
these locations did not differ from control locations in terms of real estate prices, online reviews or
political outcomes before immigration. When a shelter was established, rental prices and ratings
for existing places declined in the immediate vicinity. Additionally, I show that the anti-immigrant
German AfD party received a higher share of the vote near the refugee shelters. However, these
effects are relatively small, and the measured decline in perceived neighbourhood quality explains
at most a third of the effect of shelters on voting outcomes (an alternative mechanism could be the
increased salience of the continent-wide crisis in the affected areas). The effect on rental prices
and ratings is also very local, while the effect on voting outcomes is significant even at a greater
distance.
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1.1 Introduction
Immigration has been one of the central issues in recent European and US electoral cam-
paigns. The European refugee crisis of 2015 in particular has received strong attention,
and in Germany, it is widely understood to be the main driver behind the rise of the right-
wing AfD party.1 What explains this opposition to immigration?
One possibility is that voters oppose immigration out of economic self-interest, for
example if their job security or wages are threatened. This view is supported by a lit-
erature showing negative effects of low-skilled immigration on wages and employment
of low-skilled natives (e.g. Card (2001), Borjas (2003), Borjas and Monras (2017)); at
the same time, it is especially low-skilled individuals who oppose immigration (Scheve
and Slaughter (2001), Mayda (2006), Facchini and Mayda (2009)). On the other hand,
Facchini et al. (2013) show that low-skilled natives are more hostile to immigration even
in a context where immigrants are high-skilled, and Rozo and Vargas (2018) show that
only culturally more distant international refugees provoke a backlash, whereas internally
displaced persons help the left-wing, more pro-immigration party.
Therefore, anxiety over cultural change, weakened social norms and declining quality
of local amenities may be the more important channels. Using survey data, Card et al.
(2012) show that such concerns for local amenities are more predictive of opposition to
immigration than labor market concerns (see also Dustmann and Preston (2007), Hain-
mueller and Hopkins (2014) and Hainmueller et al. (2015)). There are however few stud-
ies on how the quality of amenities changes due to immigration or ethnic heterogeneity,
and even fewer which investigate whether this is an important mechanism driving voting
outcomes.
In this paper, I investigate these questions in the context of the refugee crisis of 2014-
2016 in Berlin. I use real estate data from the largest German listings website, immo-
bilienscout24.de, to show how rental prices are affected by the presence of a refugee shel-
ter. Additionally, I use place-ratings from the website Foursquare to show changes in how
these neighbourhoods are perceived. The majority of Foursquare places are businesses
such as restaurants and shops, but public places such as parks and metro stations are also
included. Rental prices decline by 3%, and a rating given to an existing place becomes
1A post-election survey of AfD voters revealed that 92% of respondents thought that “the party (AfD)
mainly exists to change the refugee policies with its initiatives”, while 97% said that they feared a loss of
German culture due to immigration (Infratest/dimap (2017))
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20% less likely to be positive when a refugee shelter opens nearby. These phenomena
point to a perceived decline in the quality of the neighbourhood. There is some evidence
for increased creation of new businesses near refugee shelters, especially Turkish and
Middle Eastern restaurants, which is consistent with neighbourhood changes which cater
to the new inhabitants. Additionally, I show that in the electoral districts closest to refugee
shelters, the percentage of voters voting for the AfD party increased by 10%. This is true
both for the 2016 Berlin Senate Elections and the 2017 Federal Elections.
I also discuss the relevance of the decline in rental prices and ratings as a channel
for the voting outcomes. Using these as intermediate outcomes changes the quantitative
importance of proximity to a refugee shelter only moderately. I demonstrate that this
method is likely biased in the direction of overestimating the importance of the rental
price and ratings channel. Furthermore, areas with many public venues, such as parks and
squares, experienced an especially strong decline in ratings when a shelter was opened
nearby. However, these areas did not see a larger increase in right-wing voting. Similarly,
the effect of shelters on rental prices and ratings is limited to very nearby places, while
their effect on voting has a much wider radius.
These findings underline that the effect of shelters on right-wing voting mainly works
through channels other than the decline in neighbourhood quality reflected in rental prices
and ratings. One such alternative channel could be that the Europe-wide crisis is more
visible in areas near a refugee shelter, increasing the salience of this issue in the minds of
voters.
My main results come from difference-in-differences specifications. I use a complete
panel of shelter locations, capacities and dates of operation to define treatment variables.
To address concerns that the locations of refugee shelters are endogenously determined,
I show that these locations did not differ from non-treated areas in a large variety of
characteristics. This includes levels and trends of real estate prices, political outcomes,
ratings and the types of local businesses. In addition, the results are robust to the use of an
instrument, namely the availability of infrastructure to house refugees (in public schools).
The previous literature has shown that immigration and social heterogeneity can have
a negative impact on the quality of local amenities, by lowering the willingness to en-
gage in the community, contribute to public goods and sanction antisocial behaviour (see
e.g. Alesina et al. (1999), Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), Miguel and Gugerty (2005),
Dahlberg et al. (2012), and Algan et al. (2016)). I argue that the consequences of such
changes would affect not only the quality of housing, but also the restaurants, shops and
15
public places present in the Foursquare database.
Housing outcomes can be affected in various ways by immigration. The demand from
immigrants can drive up prices in larger geographic areas (see e.g. Saiz (2007), Ottaviano
et al. (2012)); but there is also some evidence that more locally, prices can decline due to
natives valuing the area less (Accetturo et al. (2014) and Sá (2014)). This can lead to the
out-migration of natives and residential segregation, such as in the case of ’white flight’
from US urban centers (see Boustan (2010), Boustan et al. (2010)). The negative price
effects I show are unlikely to be partially offset by an opposing demand effect, given that
they are very locally constrained, and can therefore be interpreted more easily as a signal
of a decrease in the subjective quality of local amenities.
With respect to political outcomes, the larger literature has often found that immigra-
tion, particularly of individuals with low skills or strong cultural differences, increases
the electoral success of parties opposed to immigration (Barone et al. (2016), Halla et al.
(2017), Harmon (2017)). This effect may be limited to low-skilled voters (Mayda et al.
(2018)). Dustmann et al. (2016) and Gerdes and Wadensjö (2008) show an increase in
right-wing votes in Denmark caused by refugee allocation, while Dinas et al. (2016) show
the same for the Greek islands which house refugees. On the other hand, Steinmayr
(2016) finds a negative impact of refugees on right-wing votes in Austria, noting that
direct exposure can lead to decreased prejudice (the contact hypothesis).
Typically, the unit of observation in these papers are larger areas, e.g. counties or
municipalities, rather than neighbourhoods around conspicuous immigrant housing, but
Otto and Steinhardt (2014) find the same effect for neighbourhoods in Hamburg.
The wider economic consequences of refugee immigration have also received special
attention in recent years. Akgündüz et al. (2015), Del Carpio and Wagner (2015), Borjas
and Monras (2017), and Hennig (2018) focus on labour market changes, while Alix-
Garcia et al. (2018) and Altindag et al. (2018) show positive effects on prices and produc-
tion.
To this literature I add an investigation of a new and related outcome, namely how
businesses and other amenities in the neighbourhood change due to the establishment of a
refugee shelter. While the ratings are indeed negatively affected by the establishment of a
shelter, I conclude that the contemporaneous increase in support for right-wing parties is
not mainly a consequence of the neighbourhood decline, meaning that other mechanisms
musr also be at work.
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The paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the data and the historical con-
text. Section 3 provides estimation results both on electoral outcomes and on the es-
tablishment and perceived quality of venues. Section 4 explores whether the decline in
real estate prices and ratings is a channel for the electoral impact. Section 5 discusses
the robustness of different specifications, including the IV specification, while section 6
concludes.
1.2 Data and historical background
1.2.1 The refugee crisis in Berlin
During the 2014-2016 European Refugee crisis, more than 70 Thousand initial applica-
tions for asylum were made in Berlin. This represents roughly 2% of Berlin’s population
of 3.6 Million, the highest per-capita figure of any German Federal State except for the
small city state of Bremen2. Because of its dense development and increasingly tight
housing market, this meant that Berlin is the place where the refugee inflow was most
acutely experienced by the local population.
The Berlin Office for Refugee Affairs (Landesamt für Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten, LAF)
provides information on all shelters in operation, including their exact location, capacity
and occupancy. I have obtained this list at two different points in time, once in September
2016 and once in January 2018. There is considerable overlap between the two lists, but
some shelters have closed while others have opened between the dates.
Additionally, some shelters – especially among those located in gymnasiums of public
schools – had already been closed in the summer of 2016. From these lists, I construct a
panel of 177 shelters, which I believe to be mostly complete. 96 of those shelters where
still in operation in January of 2018. I have also collected their opening and (where
applicable) closing dates, to be able to pinpoint the exact month when a neighbourhood
would be treated.
According to the LAF, resources where so strained during the refugee crisis that shel-
ters were opened where it was possible, without consideration of political or social con-
sequences. This was communicated to the media and also confirmed to me via email. I
largely validate this claim in section 5 (Robustness and validity), showing that the eventual
2BAMF, Das Bundesamt in Zahlen 2014-2016, Asyl
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Figure 1.1: Location of refuge shelters in Berlin
shelter locations do not differ from others either in terms of previous results for right-wing
parties or in the composition, type and quality of local places.
The majority of shelters were established in pre-existing buildings. Frequently, these
were gymnasiums of public schools (48 instances in my list), and I could confirm this
for at least 89 other shelters, for example in unused administrative buildings. At least 19
shelters were temporary structures.
The fact that the premises of public schools where often used as locations for a shelter
enables me to use the proximity of such a school as an instrument for the eventual prox-
imity of a shelter (see section 4, robustness and validity). However, while the results are
robust to the use of this instrument, the locations of schools actually show less balanced
characteristics before the crisis than the true locations of shelters, which is why I prefer
to simply use these true locations as treated areas in a differences-in-differences setting.
As can be seen in Figure 1.1, the shelters are distributed across Berlin; however, the
more densely developed centre of the city has more shelters. The population living in the
centre consequently is more likely to live close to a refugee shelter (Fig. 1.2).
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Figure 1.2: Distance of voting tracts to nearest shelter
1.2.2 Independent variables
This distance to a shelter will be my main treatment, either as a continuous variable or as
a dummy indicating that a shelter is close. In my preferred specifications, I simply create
a treatment dummy T dit , indicating whether there is an open shelter within d meters of the
observation. For real estate listings and place ratings, I use the exact address to calculate
the distance; in the case of voting precincts, I use the centroid of their area.
During 2016, 1% (371 of 40,080 observations) of real estate listings are within 100m
of a shelter. 4.5% (1,832) are within 200m, and 25% (9,942) within 500m. Of the voting
precincts, 1% (18 of 1,470) are within 100m, 4% (61) are within 200m, and 23.5% (346)
within 500m.
Shelters vary considerably in size. Their capacity ranges from 30 to 1200 places, with
a mean of 300.3 Additionally, some locations are close to several shelters, and distance is
a continuous variable, with close proximity presumably having a higher impact.
I therefore create a treatment variable that takes both distance and capacity of all nearby
shelters into account. It is defined as the sum of the capacities (in hundred beds) of the
3The largest shelter, at the former Tempelhof airport, temporarily had an even larger capacity of more
than 4000 places.
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three closest shelters, each divided by the square root of the shelter’s distance to a place,
or
Tit =
5∑
j=1
c jt√
di j
. (1.1)
Shelters j = 1, 2, 3 have capacities of c j, and are located at a distance of di j from place
i (or the centroid of voting precinct i). 4
The mean treatment value (when observations are the voting precincts) is .25 during
the year of 2016, with a standard deviation of .14. 5% of voting districts have a treatment
value of .55 or higher.
I discuss in section 5 how treated and untreated precincts did not differ from each other
in trends or levels before the crisis (see e.g. the balance table 1.18).
1.2.3 Elections
My main unit of observation for election outcomes is the voting precinct, the districts
served by one polling station. This is the basic unit at which votes are counted. There are
1779 such precincts in Berlin, serving on average 1343 eligible voters (see Table 1.1). The
state election supervisor for Berlin publishes party vote totals and percentages at this level
for every election held in Berlin, be they senatorial (state), federal or European elections.
The AfD party received 14.2% of the vote in the Berlin senatorial elections of 2016,
and 12% of the Berlin vote in the 2017 federal elections. During previous elections, it
received a much lower percentage of the vote - 4.9% in the Federal Elections of 2013
and 7.9% in the European elections of 2014 - and before 2013, it did not exist. It was
also founded with a very different platform from the one it would adopt after the refugee
crisis, namely one with a much larger focus on the European debt crisis and the Euro,
rather than immigration.
This must be kept in mind when we use difference-in-difference specifications to esti-
mate our effects of interest: earlier votes for the AfD do not necessarily capture the full
potential of anti-immigrant votes before the refugee crisis.
4I only use the 3 closest shelters because the minimum distance of a place to the fourth-closest shelter
is greater than 500m, a distance at which the impact of a shelter on a neighbourhood (beyond the impact of
3 closer shelters) is small.
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Table 1.1: Voting tracts in Berlin, Federal Elections 2017
N: 1779 (in 2017) Mean Median St.D.
Eligible voters 1,343 1285 386
Votes 698 681 195
Voting for AfD (%) 13.5 12.8 6.5
Area (km2) .5 .2 1.2
Distance from centre (km) 8.7 8.1 4.5
Distance to nearest refugee shelter (km) 1.4 1.2 .98
As can be seen in the map Figure 1.3, the outer voting precincts, and particularly those
in the east, voted more strongly for the AfD party than in the centre of the city. This is
the reason I control for distance from the centre as well as district, interacted with the
treatment dummy for the years 2016-2017, in my main specifications.
The median area of voting tracts is 190t m2, (mean: 500t m2), so that a representative
district, if it were square, would have all points within roughly 250m of its centroid.
Therefore, I define such precincts where the distance from the shelter to the centroid is
250m or less as treatment districts.
1.2.4 Real estate data
The real estate listings website immobilienscout24.de is the largest such service in Ger-
many. Real estate agencies as well as private landlords use it to make their offers conve-
niently searchable for prospective buyers and tenants. Beyond currently available listings
and accompanying detailed exposés, the website includes an "atlas" where clients can
retrieve information about past listings in the vicinity of a given address, to form an im-
pression of price developments in the area.
I have scraped this information from the atlas, since in contrast to the current listings, it
includes listings going back to 2010. The available variables are the exact address, price,
size, and number of rooms as well as the real estate agency handling the listing.
I was able to webscrape and geolocate roughly 250,000 individual ratings. The majority
of these (about 200,000) are for apartment rentals, with the rest being house rentals or
purchase listings. Berlin has experienced a real estate boom during the period under
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Figure 1.3: Success of AfD party in Berlin, 2017 federal elections
study, which is reflected in my data by a 66% increase in the mean rental price from 6.76
Euro per square metre in 2010 to 11.23 Euro in 2018.
1.2.5 Ratings and Places data
I use data from the local search website Foursquare to construct additional variables.
Foursquare makes its data available through an API, free of charge for non-commercial
applications. It includes a large database of “venues” - geocoded places such as restau-
rants and other businesses, but also e.g. parks, streets and bus stops. Users can create these
venues and give “tips” on them, which include a rating (“like”, “dislike” and “meh”) and
a text review. For greater clarity, I refer to venues and tips as places and ratings.
The creation of places as well as the ratings come with a time stamp, making it possible
to create a panel of many characteristics of areas over time - for example the number and
type of businesses as well as average ratings of these businesses.
For Berlin, there are roughly 66 thousand unique places in the database, which have
together received 81 thousand ratings (16.5 thousand places have received at least one
rating). For each place, one or more categories are given - “Office” and “Café” are the
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Number of Venues 68,902
- at least 1 rating 16,252
- at least 5 ratings 4,815
- Office 3200
- Café 1967
- Residential 1785
- Bakery 1743
- Bus Stop 1425
... ...
- Italian 1023
- Doner 380
- Turkish 264
- Middle Eastern 175
Table 1.2: Venues on Foursquare
Number of Tips 80,166
- ’liked’ .49
- ’disliked’ .04
- ’meh’ .06
- none .4
- English .56
- German .36
- Russian .03
- Turkish .02
Table 1.3: Tips on Foursquare
most common, but there are also numerous places in categories related to immigration
from the refugee origin countries - “Doner”, “Falafel” and “Middle Eastern”, for example.
The first set of variables I constructed from the Foursquare data are counts of newly
created places by month and voting precint, as well their as counts in specific categories.
I also construct the mean rating and mean price category of these places. In the absence
of small-scale census data (the census is only broken down to the 12 districts of Berlin),
these variables allow us to assess whether or not refugee shelter locations can truly be
seen as similar to locations without shelters.
The aggregate variables on the level of the voting tract can also be used as outcome
variables. They give us an indication of how the composition of neighbourhoods changes,
e.g. if there is increased creation of new businesses of certain types, and if so if these differ
in price and perceived quality from those created not in the proximity of a shelter.
It has to be kept in mind that this is not an official and complete business register. If
business creation on Foursquare increases or declines in a certain area, this could be due
to the fact that Foursquare users and developers give this area greater or lower attention.
Secondly, I consider if ratings given to places in a certain area are more or less likely
to be positive or negative, what language is used in the text etc. This I can do for ratings
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of all places or only of places in specific categories. Note that there are almost as many
places as there are ratings; the majority of places never receives any rating. My estimates
on the probability of receiving a positive rating, which will include place fixed effects, are
estimates off the minority of places which have received multiple ratings.
In addition to creating these outcome variables, I also use the Foursquare data to create
covariates for the analysis of electoral outcomes. For example, the presence of a refugee
shelter can have a different impact in areas where there is already a strong immigrant
presence. Official population data for Berlin is only available at the coarse level of the
district; using this finely grained data enables me to e.g. observe restaurants with immi-
grant cuisine and use it as an indicator for immigrant presence. I also use the average
price ratings on foursquare as an indicator of the wealth of an area.
In Appendix 1.C I show correlations of these Foursquare measures of wealth and for-
eign population with the official data available on the level of the 12 district.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Real estate prices and listings
Prices: I first study the impact of refugee shelters on real estate prices. The observations
are individual rental listings (apartments and houses)5. I regress the price per square metre
on treatment and controls as follows:
yi jt = βTit + γXit + FEt + FE j + i jt (1.2)
where i is the listing and j the voting tract. Since I have precise information on the
operation dates of shelters, I can use a monthly panel where the treatment variable Tt j
varies from month to month, when new shelters are opened. Tti is defined first, for clarity
of interpretation, as a dummy taking the value of 1 after a shelter opens within 100m of a
place i.
The geographic fixed effects are on the level of the voting precinct, and time fixed
effects are for individual months. I also include linear time trends for the voting precincts
5purchase listings are similarly impacted, but they are much fewer.
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as a robustness check, but since they do not change the results but slow down calculations
considerably, I omit them in my main specifications.
The controls included at basement are only size, a dummy for if the listing is for a house
(rather than an apartment - the large majority), and the number of rooms (as a categorical
variable).
The results show a decline by about 37 cents for those rentals very close (within 100m)
of an operating refugee shelter (see table 1.4). That is about 3% of the average rent.
Table 1.4: Nearby refugee shelter and rental prices - treatment
dummy
Outcome variable Rental price (e per m2)
Shelter within 100m -0.360** -0.372** -0.375**
(0.152) (0.150) (0.146)
FE voting precinct X X X
FE month × year (time) X X X
Distance from center × time X X
Linear trends by voting precinct X
R squared 0.201 0.829 0.833
N. of observations 208,390 208,390 208,390
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Standard errors clustered at
place and time level.
Number of listings and repeated listings: If a refugee shelter increases the number of
new listings in a neighborhood, it would be an indication that previous residents are mov-
ing away to avoid the immigrants. To study this, it is necessary to aggregate the number
of listings by a geographical unit. I use the voting precincts for any such aggregation in
this paper.
I regress the number of immoscout24.de listings on a treatment variable as follows:
Nit = β(closei × postt) + ΓXi × postt + FEt + FEi + it (1.3)
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Nit is the number of listings in voting precinct i in year t. The treatment variable is the
interaction of a dummy closei (the closest shelter location is within 200m of the voting
precinct centroid) with the post-crisis dummy postt (any year after 2015). Geographic
controls Xi are interacted with the post-crisis dummy to avoid picking up any mechanical
effect, by which denser precincts closer to the centre are more likely to be treated and also
have different real estate dynamics beyond the impact of shelters.
The results can be seen in table 1.5. We note that the number of listings increases by
roughly 2 per year after a shelter opened nearby (specification (1). The average number
of listings per year is 16).
One limitation of my data is that I do not have the date at which a listings was with-
drawn, so that I cannot observe how long an apartment stays on the market. However,
some apartments are quickly re-listed on the platform - real estate agents could do this if
they haven’t found a new tenant and want to update the exposee e.g. with pictures to give
it a more prominent position on the website. Apartments that remain unoccupied for a
longer time are more likely to be re-listed in this way.
For the purposes of this study, I define listings for an apartment that has been listed less
than 6 months before as re-listings. Since these are long-term rentals (rather than sublets
or holiday rentals), I assume that these apartments have remained unoccupied in between
the original listing and the re-listing.
When I subtract such re-listings from the number of listings per voting precincts, I
obtain the number of new listings. If I regress these on our treatment variable, we see
that it increased considerably less than the total number of listings (table 1.5, (2)). The
difference is (mechanically) made up by re-listings (3). The effect on new listings is 1.1
relative to an average of 13, while the effect on re-listings is 1.1 relative to an average of
2.5 per year per voting precinct.
Taken together, this indicates that there are indeed slightly more new listings on the
website after a shelter opened nearby. However, the effect on re-listings, and therefore on
the likelyhood that an apartment remains vacant for a longer time, is more important in
relative terms.
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Table 1.5: Nearby refugee shelter and number of real estate listing
Outcome variable Number of listings
(1) Total (2) New listings (3) Re-listings
Shelter within 100m 2.204*** 1.088** 1.105***
(0.444) (0.322) (0.271)
Distance from center × time X X X
FE voting precinct X X X
FE month × year (time) X X X
R squared 0.568 0.629 0.265
N. of observations 9,880 9,880 9,880
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Standard errors clustered at place and
time level.
1.3.2 Public amenities and their Ratings
Next I investigate the impact of shelters on place ratings. Observations are individual
’tips’ - ratings with a review/description text - of which there are 81,122 in Berlin during
the years 2010 to 2017. I use a linear probability model taking the form
yi jt = βTt j + FEt + FE j + i jt (1.4)
where j is an individual venue, e.g. a business. Using fixed effects on the level of the
venue, the coefficient of interest β is only identified from those venues that exist before
and after the establishment of refugee shelters. Since I have precise information on the
operation dates of shelters, I can use a monthly panel where the treatment variable Tt j
varies from month to month, when new shelters are opened. Tt j is defined first, for clarity
of interpretation, as a dummy taking the value of 1 after a shelter opens within 200m of
a place j. My preferred specification is however the one defined as above in (1.1), taking
into account the distance and capacity of all nearby shelters.
I also use voting tract fixed effects rather than venue FE in some specifications, to
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allow for an effect on the establishment of new venues around refugee shelters, which
could have systematically different ratings and reviews.
The outcome variables yi jt are dummies, e.g. for whether or not a rating was positive
or whether it was in German. For some regressions, I restrict the sample to certain places
of special interest to us.
Table 1.6: Nearby refugee shelter and ratings of existing places,
all places - treatment dummy
Outcome variable (1) ’liked’ (2) ’disliked’ (3) ’meh’
Shelter within 200m -0.12*** 0.01 -0.02
(0.044) (0.018) (0.028)
FE place X X X
FE month × year X X X
R squared 0.31 0.08 0.07
N. of observations 80,166 80,166 80,166
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Standard errors
clustered at place and time level.
The outcomes can be seen in tables 1.6 for the treatment dummy, and 1.7 for the con-
tinuous treatment variable. The results indicate roughly the same effects - as can be seen
in table 1.7, ratings for a place are less likely to be positive after refugee shelters have
opened in the vicinity of the venue. The likelihood of the rating being explicitly negative
is unchanged, and an ambivalent rating (’meh’) becomes more likely. The decline of pos-
itive ratings by 1.4 percentage points is not large when we consider that about 46% of tips
on the platform are positive. The treatment variable is roughly 1 on average, and the 90th
percentile is around 1.9. A ’highly treated’ place would therefore be around 3 percentage
points less likely to receive a high rating (we will see later that places very close to a
shelter – within 100m – see a much larger impact). Use of the treatment dummy variable
suggest somewhat smaller impacts (table 1.6).
I will use my continuous treatment variable in the remaining regressions in this sub-
section, since it gives a more complete picture of the intensity of refugee housing in an
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Table 1.7: Nearby refugee shelter and ratings of existing places, all
places - continuous treatment
Outcome variable (1) ’liked’ (2) ’disliked’ (3) ’meh’
Shelters capacity/distance -0.014** 0.001 0.008*
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005)
FE place X X X
FE month × year X X X
R squared 0.31 0.08 0.07
N. of observations 80166 80166 80166
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Standard errors clustered
at place and time level.
area. When the results of regressions with the simpler treatment dummy differ from those
presented here, I will note it in the discussion (those results are available on request).
The main coefficient does not change greatly when we restrict the sample to only those
venues which have received 10 or more ratings or when we include the geographic con-
trols introduced in the section on election outcomes (Table 1.8, specifications (1) and (2)
respectively).
This decline on ratings could in principle only affect certain types of places. If we
restrict our sample to public places such as parks and roads, or to Turkish and Middle
Eastern restaurants, we see that the former are impacted at a similar magnitude as all
places, while the latter are potentially less impacted (the coefficients are less precisely
measured due to the smaller sample). If only German language ratings are considered,
we again find no difference to the overall coefficient (these regressions on subsamples are
reported in Table 1.9).
Newly established venues and their composition: We are also interested in the ques-
tion of whether areas around refugee shelters experience changes in business activity.
New businesses could open to cater to refugee demand, while at the same time, the area
could become less attractive for other businesses. I study the establishment of new places
on Foursquare in the vicinity of shelters, keeping in mind that this can only be an in-
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Table 1.8: Nearby refugee shelter and ratings of existing places, all places
Model (1) Restricted (2) Geo. controls
’liked’
Shelters capacity/distance -0.017** -0.013*
(0.008) (0.007)
Distance to centre× (2016 or 2017) 0.00
(0.00)
FE venue X X
FE Year X X
R squared adjusted 0.29 0.31
N 51,614 80,166
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Standard errors clustered at
district level in (3).
Table 1.9: Nearby refugee shelter and ratings of existing places, subsamples
Subsample (1) All places (2) Public (3) MEastern (4) German review
Outcome variable ’liked’
Shelters capacity/distance -0.014** -0.012 -0.002 -0.015
(0.007) (0.016) (0.031) (0.014)
FE voting tract X X X X
FE Year X X X X
R squared 0.31 0.35 0.27 0.35
N. of observations 80,166 13,113 3,169 26,585
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Standard errors clustered at district level in (3).
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dication of true business activity - not all businesses are recorded, and the activity of
Foursquare users could itself be subject to changes in the neighbourhood.
It appears that there is a slight increase in the number of newly established venues
driven by nearby shelters (table 1.10, (1)), as well as in the establishment of new Middle
Eastern and Turkish restaurants (2). On average, 1.56 new places are created in a voting
precinct each month, and .008 Middle Eastern and Turkish restaurants. So while the
coefficient of .06 on the creation of all new places is not large relative to the base rate,
the creation rate of the relevant ethnic restaurants of .002 is relatively high (and this is
the value for the average treatment, not the areas at the 90th percentile of our treatment
variables).
It should be noted however that these effects on the creation of new businesses are only
weakly significant, and are insignificant when we use the ’dummy’ treatment variable.
The average rating of newly established businesses is not affected (3), and neither is
the average price level (4).
It would be interesting to investigate this further, since in the longer run we do expect
a shelter to affect the categories of businesses created more than this limited evidence
suggests.
Table 1.10: Nearby refugee shelter and newly established places
Outcome variable (1) all venues (2) Turkish & MEastern (3) rating (4) price
Shelters capacity/distance 0.063* 0.002* -0.039 0.021
(0.032) (0.001) (0.065) (0.014)
FE voting tract X X X X
FE Year X X X X
R squared 0.814 0.077 0.195 0.124
N. of observations 11,161 11,161 3,067 5,867
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Standard errors clustered at district level in (3).
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1.3.3 Elections
For ease of interpretation, I will again first show the results using the simple treatment
dummy, which is 1 the electoral precinct has any shelter within 200m from its centroid.
In following The preferred model I use is a simple diff-in-diff model of the form
right_voteshareit = β(closei × postt) + ΓXi × postt + FEt + FEi + FEd × postt + it
(1.5)
where i is the voting precinct and t denotes specific elections - -the Berlin senatorial
elections of 2006, 2011 and 2016, as well as the federal elections of 2009, 2013 and 2017.
closei is a dummy taking the value of 1 if the centre of the polling district is within 250
metres of a refugee shelter, and the dummy postt is one for the elections of 2016 and 2017.
FEi is the fixed effect on the polling station, while FEt is the election fixed effect. I also
use geographic variables Xi interacted with the post-dummy; these include the precinct’s
area and distance to the centre of Berlin. I prefer to include these due to the geographic
concentration of treated areas near the centre of the city (which also have a smaller area).6
As discussed before, each electoral district has around 1500 voters.
The results table are presented in Table 1.11). Specification (1) does not include any
geographic controls other than the fixed effects. My preferred specifications (2) and (3)
include distance to the centre of Berlin as the only such control. They differ in so far as
(3) estimates only within-district effects by including an additional FE for each district
after the refugee crisis; these additional controls would be important if e.g. there are
differences in the impact between Western and Eastern districts. However, they do not
change our main coefficient.
These specifications indicate that the voteshare of right-wing parties increased by 1.2
additional percentage points in those voting tracts where a refugee shelter is nearby. This
is about 10% of the median AfD voteshare of 12.8%.
This magnitude is confirmed a model using the natural logarithm rather than the level
of the outcome variable (model 4). The shelters increase the voteshare by about 10%.
6The previous level of right-wing support does not fully capture the potential for increase in radical
votes in 2016 and 2017. The highest increase happened in the poorer and less densely populated outer areas
of Berlin. Since many of the shelters are in the more densely populated inner residential areas, and since the
outer polling tracts are larger in area, the outer polling stations also happen to be further away from shelters
on average (see Figures 1 and 2 for visual evidence of this geographic correlation).
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Table 1.11: Nearby refugee shelter and right-wing vote share, treatment dummy
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome right-wing voteshare ln(rw voteshare)
Independent variables
Shelter within 200m 0.006** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.102***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.019)
Distance to centre× (2016 or 2017) 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.016
(0.001) (0.001) (0.009)
FE voting precinct X X X X
FE election X X X X
FE district × (2016 or 2017) X
R squared (adjusted) 0.795 0.827 0.869 0.857
N. of observations 10,958 10,958 10,958 10,857
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Standard errors clustered at district and year levels.
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Interestingly, the geographic variables are less significant and have smaller importance
relative to the treatment coefficient compared with specifications (2) and (3).7
The results when using the continuous variable indicate a stronger effect of the presence
of shelters on voting outcomes (table 1.12), of 5 percentage points (model 1) or 3 points
(model 2, where differences between districts are controlled for). We will see later that
the effect of shelters on voters is present at a larger distance than 200m; it is possible that
the continuous treatment variable captures e.g. the effect of some large shelters within a
distance of 200-1000m of a voting precinct, something that the simple dummy does not
capture.
We will see later (in section 4) that these result are in their sign robust to a number
of different specifications, including the use of proximity of a public school as an instru-
ment. I will however argue that this OLS specification is preferable; most importantly,
the ’treated’ areas do not have different political outcomes to untreated areas before the
refugee crisis.
1.3.4 Heterogeneity of electoral impact
We expect the impact on electoral outcomes to be different from one voting tract to the
other, depending on local characteristics. For example, we might think that having a
shelter nearby has a stronger impact on right-wing voting in voting tracts of low density,
simply because the shelter and refugees would be more visible in such an environment. I
define density as eligible voters per 100m2, so that it has a mean of 0.79.
A voting tract where there is already a large foreign (and especially Middle Eastern)
presence might also be differently impacted, although we can imagine arguments for an
effect in either direction. Since census data on the level of voting tracts is not available,
I use the Foursquare data to find a proxy for this variable, namely the number of Turkish
and Middle Eastern restaurants. On average, there are .55 such establishments in a voting
tract, but more than half of them do not have such a restaurant at all.
Lastly, voters in more wealthy areas could also react differently. As a (certainly imper-
fect) proxy for prosperity, I take the average price category of Foursquare places in the
7I will discuss this in more detail in section 4 (Robustness), but the distance from the centre likely picks
up an effect that is not accounted for by the additive fixed effects model; the logarithmic specification, in
contrast, possibly accounts for this effect by assuming that the location and time fixed effects interact in a
multiplicative fashion on the voteshare.
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Table 1.12: Nearby refugee shelter and right-wing vote share,
continuous treatment variable
Model (1) (2)
Outcome right-wing voteshare
Independent variables
Shelters capacity/distance 0.051*** 0.030***
(0.007) (0.006)
Distance to centre× (2016 or 2017) 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
FE voting precinct X X
FE election X X
FE district × (2016 or 2017) X
R squared (adjusted) 0.829 0.869
N. of observations 10,958 10,958
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Standard errors
clustered at district and year levels.
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voting tract.
I interact these three variables - density, presence of Middle Eastern restaurants, and
average price category of places - with our continuous treatment variable accounting for
nearby shelters. The results from this regression can be seen in table 1.13. Density has
indeed the expected effect (column 2) - where a new shelter would be more visible (lower
density), it has a much stronger impact on right-wing voting. Voting tracts with higher
presence of Middle Eastern or Turkish restaurants actually saw a lower impact, probably
due to the fact that voters in these tracts are more used to, and more sympathetic towards,
foreign immigration. Lastly, the price level as given by our proxy variable also has a
negative interaction with the treatment variable in affecting rigt-wing voting (this last
interaction is not significant when the treatment dummy is used).
These heterogeneous effects appear to be quite sizeable - recall that density as defined
here is roughly .8 on average, and the number of ME restaurants .55. The coefficients
on the interactions are therefore large relative to the direct effect. This has important
implications for where to locate refugee shelters, if policy makers aim to mitigate the
impact of shelters on an electoral backlash.
1.3.5 Type of shelter
The LAF distinguishes two main types of shelters, the Gemeinschaftsunterkunft (commu-
nity shelter, GU) and the Notunterkunft (emergency shelter, NU). Presumably, refugees
will be visible in the vicinity of both GU and NU, but the NU are more clearly a reminder
of a crisis situation, and may be seen as a sign of its mismanagement. If these types of
shelters have no different impact on our outcomes, it may be seen as a sign that voters
simply object to the presence of refugees, while a stronger impact of NU would indicate
that at least part of the political backlash is due to the perceived chaotic circumstances
rather than simply immigration alone.
I investigate if the impact of a NU shelter is different from other shelters (mostly GU)
by interacting the dummy for a nearby shelter with another dummy that indicates a NU.
The negative impact on ratings is much higher for NU, which is what we would expect.
However, the impact on electoral outcomes may even be smaller (the coefficient is not
significant). This is unexpected, but perhaps voters in the vicinity of emergency shelters
were reassured that they would only be temporary.
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Table 1.13: Nearby refugee shelter and local characteristics, electoral outcomes
Outcome variable right-wing voteshare
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shelters capacity/distance 0.051*** 0.083*** 0.064*** 0.085***
(0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010)
Shelters capacity/distance × Density -0.039***
(0.007)
Shelters capacity/distance ×ME rest. -0.030***
(0.004)
Shelters capacity/distance × price level -0.028***
(0.006)
Distance to centre× (2016 or 2017) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
FE voting tract X X X X
FE Year X X X X
R squared 0.829 0.832 0.834 0.830
N. of observations 10,958 10,958 10,958 10,151
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Standard errors clustered at district level in (3).
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Table 1.14: The impact of emergency shelters (NU) vs. community shelters
Outcome (1) Right-wing voteshare (2) Negative ratings
Independent variables
Shelter within 200m 0.015*** -0.09**
(0.005) (0.04)
Shelter within 200m × shelter is NU -0.019 -0.04**
(0.012) (0.02)
FE year X X
FE district X
FE venue X
R squared 0.83 0.18
N. of observations 13,283 160097
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Standard errors clustered at district level in (3).
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1.4 Is the change in perceived neighbourhood quality a
mechanism for voting outcomes?
The previous section established the impact of refugee shelters on real estate prices, the
ratings and types of places in the neighbourhood and on contemporaneous electoral out-
comes. However, this does not tell us how much the decline in perceived neighbourhood
quality, as documented in the real estate and foursquare data, contributed to the electoral
backlash against refugee immigration. In fact, I argue in this section that the changes
documented in the ratings data are only a moderately important channel for the voting
impact.
Mediation analysis: The first strategy is to use the intermediate outcome as a right-
hand side variable in a regression of final outcomes on the treatment status and covariates.
If this lessens the coefficient of treatment, the difference can, under strong assumptions,
be interpreted as the part of the total effect explained by the changes in the intermediate
outcome. Formally, the procedure is to estimate the system of equations
Yit = βtTit + ΓXit + 1it (1.6)
Mit = βmTit + ΓXit + 2it (1.7)
Yit = βd1Tit + β
id
1 Mit + Γ1Xit + 3it (1.8)
our outcome of interest Yit is right_voteshareit, while the intermediate outcome (or me-
diator) Mit is either the average rental price rpriceit in voting precinct i, or the proportion
of ratings which are positive likedit. The covariates Xit include fixed effects as in 1.5, as
well as the appropriate geographic controls. βt would then be interpreted as the total effect
of shelters on voting, and βd as the direct effect (that is, the effect not accounted for by
our observed channel). The product βid × βm would be the indirect effect, mediated by the
intermediate outcome likedit.
This procedure, known as mediation analysis in statistics (see Heckman and Pinto
(2015), Imai et al. (2010)), is prone to bias.8 It requires that
8Despite these problems, mediation analysis has been applied in a number of papers recently, particu-
larly in the economics of education (see e.g. Heckman et al. (2013), Oreopoulos et al. (2017)), but also in
the more closely related literature on trade, labour markets and voting outcomes (Dippel et al. (2017))
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Tit βd Yit
βm βid
Mit Qit+
−
Figure 1.4: Shelters treatment Tit affecting voting outcomes Yit directly, and through rat-
ings Mit as intermediate outcome; other, unobserved shocks to quality Qit.
{Yit,Mit} y Tit|Xit = x and
Yit y Mit|Tit = t, Xit = x (1.9)
The first assumption simply states that there are no confounding unobserved variables
affecting both treatment status and either the intermediate or final outcome variable. It is
the same assumption needed for our estimation of total treatment effects above. The sec-
ond assumption requires that there are no unobserved variables affecting both the outcome
Yit and the intermediate variable Mit, for the coefficients of 1.8 to be identified.
Despite my inclusion of fixed effects and other controls, this condition is unlikely to be
met in our application. In particular, we can expect that there are unobserved shocks to
the quality of a neighbourhood, affecting simultaneously real estate prices, the ratings of
foursquare venues and the success of right-wing parties.
However, it may be possible to make additional assumptions on the direction of the
influence of this unobserved shock on Yit and Mit. If we assume that the unrelated and
unobserved decline of neighbourhood quality would lower the ratings of businesses, and
at the same time increase the electoral success of right-wing parties, we can show in which
direction the coefficients βd and βid in 1.8 are likely biased. A regression of right-wing
electoral success Yit on real estate prices and foursquare ratings Mit,
Yit = βMit + ΓXit + FEi + FEt + it
finds a negative coefficient β, suggesting that this is indeed the direction of correlation
(see table 1.15).
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Table 1.15: Correlation of neighbourhood
quality measures and voting outcomes
Outcome right-wing voteshare
Mean rental price -0.046
(0.025)
Average rating -0.016
.009
FE year X X
FE precinct X X
R squared 0.873 0.838
N 9,878 7,509
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01:
***. Standard errors clustered at precinct and year
level.
If we assume that equation 1.8 is primarily misspecified by the omission of the un-
observed shock to neighbourhood quality Qit, the true relationship between treatment,
ratings and voting outcomes would be
Yit = βd2Tit + β
id
2 Mit + β
qQit + Γ2Xit + 3it (1.10)
while the true specification for determining real estate prices and ratings is
Mit = βmTit + βqmQit + ΓXit + 2it . (1.11)
The omitted variable bias resulting from the omission of Qit in our specification 1.8
relates the estimated coefficients βid1 and β
d
1 to the true β
id
1 and β
d
1; it is
βid1 = β
id
2 + β
q Cov(M,Q) × Var(T )
Var(M) × Var(T ) −Cov(M,T )2 (1.12)
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and
βd1 = β
d
2 − βq
Cov(M,Q) ×Cov(T,M)
Var(M) × Var(T ) −Cov(M,T )2 (1.13)
Derivations of these terms will be provided in the Appendix 1.A. If we assume that
Cov(M,Q) is positive – a positive shock to unobserved neighbourhood quality increases
real estate prices and ratings – and that βq is negative – the same shock reduces right-
wing voting – this tells us that βid1 is biased downward (away from zero). So is β
d
1, since
Cov(T,M), the effect of shelters on average ratings, is also negative.
Estimating specifications 1.6 and 1.8, we find that the treatment effect βd1 of a nearby
shelter on voting outcomes is virtually unchanged when we include the average ratings
in the voting precinct as a regressor. The effect of including real estate prices is more
sizeable (see table 1.16). The effects of the both real estate prices and average ratings, βid1 ,
have the expected negative sign, but it is small and insignificant.
The decrease of the treatment coefficient from 1.2 percentage points to .8 percentage
points when the mean rental price is included suggests that potentially, a third of the effect
of the establishment of the shelter on voting outcomes is due to the mechanism of neigh-
bourhood decline. But as we have seen, βd1 and β
id
1 are likely to be biased downward in
these regressions, so that this may overstate the importance of this channel. It provides an
upper bound, meaning that most of the treatment effect is due to unmeasured mechanisms.
In the following, I present additional pieces of evidence, strengthening this conclusion.
Distance effect: Treatment effects diminish with distance. A shelter within 100m of
the centre of a polling area, or within 100m of a venue, should have a larger impact than
one within 500m. To investigate this, I use a different treatment definition, one that only
takes the distance of the nearest shelter into account. I define four brackets, according
to the proximity of the next shelter. In bracket 1, observations are within 100m of the
next shelter, and in brackets 2, 3, and 4 the nearest shelter is within 100m-200m, 200m-
500m and 500m-1000m respectively. This defines four different treatment groups. During
2016, 39% of voting precincts, 49% of listings, and 47% of ratings now fall into one of
the treatment groups.
The results of a regression where these treatment dummies are interacted with post-
crisis dummies (as before) are presented in table 1.17. We see the expected declining
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Table 1.16: The impact of shelters on voting, RE prices
and ratings as intermediate variable
Outcome right-wing voteshare
Shelters Tit 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mean rental price -.0007
(0.0004)
Average rating -0.015
(0.009)
FE year X X X
FE precinct X X X
R squared 0.836 0.872 0.838
N 7,509 7,509 7,509
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Standard
errors clustered at precinct and year level.
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impact for voting outcomes, real estate prices, and negative tips. It is notable however,
that the impact on the measures of neighbourhood quality falls much faster in distance
than the impact on voting outcomes. The stark difference tells us that voters within 500m
of the nearest shelter are still more likely to cast their vote for the right-wing party, while
rental prices in their block do not decline and businesses in their own close vicinity do
not experience a decline in ratings.
Table 1.17: The impact of shelters, decreasing with distance
Outcome (1) RW voteshare (2) rental price (3) Positive rating
Independent variables
Shelter within 100m 0.012*** -0.37** - 0.12**
(0.002) (0.15) (0.05)
Shelter within 100m-200m 0.013*** -0.05 -0.017
(0.004) (0.11) (0.022)
Shelter within 200m-500m 0.009*** 0.03 0.023
(0.003) (0.07) (0.025)
Shelter within 500m-1000m 0.005** 0.01 -0.023
(0.002) (0.06) (0.018)
FE year X X X
FE district X X
FE venue X
R squared 0.83 0.83 0.18
N. of observations 13,283 208,390 80,166
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Standard errors clustered at district level in (3).
This set of results may not be conclusive, but it suggests that the impact of shelters on
right-wing voting works through a channel other than the ratings decline discussed above.
With the data at hand, we can not investigate all these possible channels, but one candidate
is that a nearby shelter simply increases the visibility and salience of the refugee crisis
to voters, leading them to vote for the anti-immigrant party even if there is no perceived
44
decline in the quality of their neighbourhood.
1.5 Robustness and validity
1.5.1 Common trends and balance between treated and non-treated
areas
An important concern is whether the placement of refugee shelters was influenced by
political considerations - they could for example be located in areas where support for
right-wing parties is weaker. Table 1.18 provides an overview of the differences between
areas close to the eventual locations of refugee shelters (treated) and those further away.
In terms of previous political outcomes, there was no difference between treatment and
control groups. I test this not only for our outcome variable, the right-wing voteshare, but
also for the share of the Green party (the most pro-immigration large party in Germany)
and for the share of nonvoters (since many of the AfD voters came from this group).
Treated areas also did not have different average ratings before, and the share of Turkish
or Middle Eastern restaurants relative to all places was also the same. On the other hand,
there were more Foursquare places in the treated areas, probably because they tend to be
closer to the centre of the city.9
This balance between treated and non-treated areas could however hide diverging trends.
We could find that ratings in areas where shelters would eventually open were higher at
the very beginning of our panel, and falling up to the time when shelters were opened. In
that case, the treatment effect could simply be the continuation of that trend.
To address this concern, I will demonstrate that my cross-sectional treatment variables,
capturing eventual proximity to refugee shelters, do not determine either ratings or voting
outcomes at any time prior to the refugee crisis. The regression specification is
yi,t = αt (treatmenti × TDt) + ΓXi + FEi + FEt + i,t (1.14)
where the outcome variable yi,t is either the probability of a positive rating or the right-
wing voteshare. TDtis a period dummy (quarterly for ratings, yearly for election out-
9Similar comparisons for other variables are available upon request.
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Table 1.18: Balance table, treated and untreated voting precincts
Non-treated Treated T-test
Variable N Mean/SE N Mean/SE Difference
Rightwing vote share 7675 0.038
(0.002)
343 0.035
(0.003)
0.003
Greens vote share 7675 0.177
(0.001)
343 0.193
(0.007)
-0.016
Nonvoters 7675 0.414
(0.001)
343 0.407
(0.006)
0.006
Mean rental price (apartments) 6745 7.729
(0.032)
299 7.638
(0.093)
0.092
- price development (2011-14) 6496 1.574
(0.065)
294 1.603
(0.070)
-0.029
Average rating 7094 1.286
(0.003)
325 1.272
(0.012)
0.013
Ethnic restaurants 7675 0.014
(0.000)
343 0.017
(0.001)
-0.003
Notes: The covariates area and distance to center center are included in all estimation
regressions. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.
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Figure 1.5: Ratings and proximity to shelter location, before and after opening
comes), and the treatment dummy is simply indicating the eventual opening of a shelter
within 200m.
Figure 1.5 shows the coefficients from this regression (for positive ratings). As can be
seen, the locations of shelters did not follow a different trend before the refugee crisis. It
also becomes apparent that the effect of the shelter only appeared a year after opening.
Figure 1.6 shows the same coefficients for all federal and state elections since 2006. It
becomes evident that there was no rising support for right-wing parties in these locations
before the crisis (the regressions results and coefficient plots for other political outcomes,
as well as for other ratings outcomes and treatment definitions, are available on request).
1.5.2 Places and ratings
Shelters were not opened in such voting tracts where tips where generally better or worse
before the refugee crisis (table 1.19). I have also investigated the composition of venues in
tracts which would eventually host a shelter along several dimensions; on most measures,
these are not different from others. This is notably true for the number of Turkish or
Middle Eastern restaurants in the area relative to the total number of venues (reported in
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Figure 1.6: Voting outcomes and proximity to shelter location, before and after opening
table 1.20). It appears therefore not true that the foreign population of a voting tract was
a consideration when the locations of shelters were decided.
The average ratings of places, their average price and other characteristics are also not
predictive of whether or not a shelter would be opened nearby (tables upon request). An
exception is the number of total venues in a voting tract: this is significantly higher in such
voting tracts which would be near a shelter, even when we control, as always, for the area
and distance to the centre. This points to the fact that a general abundance of facilities
meant a place for shelter could more likely be found. Conversely, it was not the case that
shelters were established mostly ’out of view’, in areas of low density (again, regression
tables are available upon request). A look at the maps in section 2 also confirms this.
Instrumental variable estimation: Another strategy to address the potential endo-
geneity of shelter locations would be to instrument them with the infrastructure com-
monly used for them. Since school grounds, school sports facilities etc. were often used
in Berlin, the distance to the next public school is one such candidate. I investigate this
instrument in Appendix 1.B.
My main results are quite robust to the use of this instrument, depending on treatment
definitions. However, as I show, the instrumented treatment locations are actually less
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Table 1.19: Nearby refugee shelter and tips in previous years
Outcome variable negative rating
Elections (1) 2011 (2) 2012 (3) 2013 (4) 2014 (5) 2015 (6) 2016 (6) 2016
Nearby shelter -0.057 -0.195 -0.054 0.955* 1.968 2.428** 2.849
(0.062) (0.589) (0.116) (0.526) (1.528) (0.951) (1.885)
Distance to centre -0.002 -0.060 -0.030*** -0.189*** -0.445*** -0.360*** -0.533***
(0.005) (0.046) (0.009) (0.040) (0.122) (0.073) (0.144)
Area 0.002 0.050 0.035** 0.183*** 0.518** 0.458*** 0.576**
(0.008) (0.078) (0.015) (0.069) (0.211) (0.120) (0.243)
FE district X X X X X X X
N. of observations 871 999 1206 1074 984 985 926
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Standard errors clustered at district level in (3).
Table 1.20: Nearby refugee shelter and Turkish and Middle Eastern restaurants in previous years
Outcome variable negative rating
Elections (1) 2011 (2) 2012 (3) 2013 (4) 2014 (5) 2015 (6) 2016 (6) 2016
Nearby shelter -0.005 -0.010 0.002 -0.008 0.004 -0.005 -0.015
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017)
Distance to centre -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Area 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
FE district X X X X X X X
N. of observations 1546 1623 1609 1420 1221 1301 1113
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Standard errors clustered at district level in (3).
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balanced with non-treatment locations then the true shelter locations. For this reason, I
prefer to use the OLS estimations.
1.5.3 Identity of users
An objection to my use of Foursquare ratings as an outcome variable is that it could be
that a refugee shelter simply attracts a different set of Foursquare users to an area. These
users could be of a type that gives worse ratings, even though their experience is no less
positive than that of users who frequented the area before.
Ideally, I would use user ID fixed effects interacted with place ID fixed effects, to only
capture users giving repeated ratings to the same place. This is however impossible: there
are 27 thousand different user IDs for 81 thousand ratings, in addition to the 16.3 place
IDs in the ratings data. Including user fixed effects completely absorbs the remaining
variation, making any treatment effect insignificant.
I can therefore only investigate if available user characteristics are impacted by the
establishment of shelters. These characteristics are user gender and the language of the
review text. The rationale for this is that if a different group of users were giving the re-
views after the establishment of a shelter, they would likely differ in language and gender.
The immigrants themselves for example would be more likely to be male and non-german.
Regressions of dummies for reviews in different languages - German, English, Turkish,
and Arabic - on our treatment and control variables from the main specification show that
this is not the case (table 1.21). As before, the 10% most treated areas have a value of 1.8
during 2017. Recall also that, in the whole dataset, the percentages of reviews in different
languages are: 56% English, 36% German, 2% Turkish, and .1% Arabic.
There is also no effect on user gender (table 1.22). At baseline, 60% of reviews are
by male users, and 30% by female users (the rest are by users who do not identify their
gender). These percentages are not significantly affected by the treatment variable.
I conclude from this evidence that the users giving ratings are not discernibly different
after the establishment of a shelter.
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Table 1.21: Distance to refugee shelter and review language
Outcome variable (1) German (2) English (3) Turkish (4) Arabic
Independent variables
Shelters capacity/distance -0.001 -0.007 -0.002 0.001
(0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001)
FE place X X X X
FE month X X X X
R squared 0.185 0.152 0.093 0.055
N. of observations 80,166 80,166 80,166 80,166
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Standard errors clustered at place and month
level.
Table 1.22: Distance to refugee shelter and review
language
Outcome variable (1) Male (2) Female
Independent variables
Shelters capacity/distance -0.004 0.010
(0.009) (0.008)
FE place X X
FE month X X
R squared 0.077 0.066
N. of observations 80,166 80,166
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Standard
errors clustered at place and month level.
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1.6 Conclusions
This study suggests that a nearby refugee shelter decreases the perceived quality of local
amenities such as restaurants. At the same time, the anti immigration AfD party has
benefited from the presence of shelters in elections after the refugee crisis. It appears
however that these are two independent outcomes, so that another mechanisms than the
perceived decline of neighbourhood quality is responsible for the effect on votes.
There is limited evidence for increased creation of businesses in the vicinity of refugee
shelters, and of Turkish and Middle Eastern restaurants in particular. This may go hand
in hand with increased unobserved business closures; it would be interesting to return to
this question in the future, and perhaps with different data.
It must be kept in mind that the Foursquare data represents subjective opinions about
local venues, and that these opinions come from a selected group of individuals. However,
taken together with e.g. the survey evidence from Greek islands in Hangartner et al.
(2017), these results indicate that emergency housing of refugees is seen as a negative for
the community.
The response to refugees may be different in less crisis-laden circumstances. The
fact that some of the negative impacts found in this study are more severe for the more
makeshift emergency shelters is an indication of this. This is of interest for the future
management of refugee housing, as is the finding that more visible shelters, and shelters
in areas without a previous presence of co-ethnic inhabitants, appear to provoke a stronger
electoral backlash.
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Appendix
1.A Bias in indirect effect regression
Assume the true relationship between voting outcomes Yit, proximity of shelters Tit and
ratings Mit is
Yit = βd2Tit + β
id
2 Mit + β
qQit + 3it
Since we do not observe the shock to neighbourhood quality Qit, we estimate
Yit = βd1Tit + β
id
1 Mit + 3it
Let X be the matrix of independent variables [T,M]. The estimated coefficients βˆ are:
βˆ =
 βˆd1
βˆid1
 = X’YX’X
which is
βˆd1 =
Var(M) ×Cov(T,Y) −Cov(T,M) ×Cov(M,Y)
Var(T ) × Var(M) −Cov(T,M)2
and
57
βˆid1 =
Var(T ) ×Cov(M,Y) −Cov(T,M) ×Cov(T,Y)
Var(T ) × Var(M) −Cov(T,M)2
Developing these expressions by substituting the true specification for Y we have for
βˆid1 :
βˆid1 =
Var(T ) ×Cov(M, βd2T + βid2 M + βqQ + 3) −Cov(T,M) ×Cov(T, βd2T + βid2 M + βqQ + 3)
Var(T ) × Var(M) −Cov(T,M)2
=
βid2
(
Var(T ) × Var(M) −Cov(T,M)2
)
+ βd2
(
Var(T ) ×Cov(T,M) − Var(T ) ×Cov(T,M)
)
Var(T ) × Var(M) −Cov(T,M)2
+
βq
(
Var(T ) ×Cov(M,Q) −Cov(T,M) ×Cov(T,Q)
)
+ V(T ) ×C(M, 3) −C(T,M) ×C(T, 3)
Var(T ) × Var(M) −Cov(T,M)2
= βid2 + β
qVar(T ) ×Cov(M,Q) −Cov(T,M) ×Cov(T,Q)
Var(T ) × Var(M) −Cov(T,M)2
Since Cov(T,Q) = 0 (the unobserved shocks are independent of treatment), this sim-
plifies to
βˆid1 = β
id
2 + β
q Var(T ) ×Cov(M,Q)
Var(T ) × Var(M) −Cov(T,M)2 .
By the same logic,
βd1 = β
d
2 − βq
Cov(M,Q) ×Cov(T,M)
Var(M) × Var(T ) −Cov(M,T )2 .
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1.B Instrumental variable estimation:
An appealing strategy to address the possible endogeneity of shelter location is to in-
strument the location of shelters with the infrastructure commonly used for them. Since
school grounds, school sports facilities etc. were often used in Berlin, the distance to
the next public school is highly predictive of the distance to the next shelter during the
refugee crisis. Via this distance channel, it also predicts the treatment variable (shelters
capacity/distance - see table 1.B.1). Equally, having a public school nearby increases the
likelyhood of having a nearby shelter - this second specification is a much worse fit how-
ever, since there are many more public school locations in Berlin than shelter locations.
For the IV regressions, I therefore prefer the continuous treatment variable, rather than
the nearby shelter dummy.
Table 1.B.1: Public schools and refugee shelters, first stage
Outcome (1) Shelter Capacity/Distance (2) Nearby shelter dummy
Independent variables
Distance to school -.038***
(0.009)
Nearby school dummy 0.014*
(0.008)
Distance to centre 0.0 -0.003
(0.006) (0.002)
FE district X X
FE Year X X
R squared 0.79 0.015
N. of observations 18,947 18,947
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Standard errors clustered at district level in (3).
When I instrument the shelter capacity/distance by the distance to the closest school
in the panel model (equation 1.5), the coefficient is close to the one obtained in the OLS
model (table 1.B.2). The IV performs much better when continuous distance to shelter is
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used than when we use a dummy, because the standard error is quite large. However, the
direction of the coefficient is the same. This gives us additional confidence that shelter
locations where not chosen according to the potential for political discontent.
The results on venue ratings are also robust to this instrumental variable strategy (tables
upon request).
However, public school location turn out to be more predictive of political outcomes
before the refugee crisis than the actual shelter location (table 1.B.3). The IV specification
thus fails a placebo test which the OLS specification largely passes.
This circumstance and our knowledge of the historical and institutional situation – es-
pecially the information given by the responsible agency that shelters were opened wher-
ever it was possible, without any political considerations – means that I prefer the OLS
specification over the IV.
Table 1.B.2: Distance to refugee shelter and right-wing vote share, OLS and IV
Model (1) OLS (2) IV (3) OLS (4) IV
Independent variables
Shelters capacity/distance 0.051*** 0.035***
(0.001) (0.004)
Nearby shelter× (2016 or 2017) 0.012*** 0.060
(0.003) (0.079)
Distance to centre× (2016 or 2017) 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FE polling station X X X X
FE election X X X X
N. of observations 13283 13283 13283 13283
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Standard errors clustered at district level in (3).
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Table 1.B.3: Nearby school in previous elections
Outcome variable right-wing voteshare
Elections (1) 2006 (2) 2009 (3) 2011 (4) 2013 (5) 2016 (6) 2017
Distance to school -0.015*** -0.002 -0.005 -0.009*** -0.025*** -0.014*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.007)
Area 0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Distance to centre 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.010*** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
FE district X X X X X X
N. of observations 1,591 1,652 1,596 1,617 1,779 1,779
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Standard errors clustered at district level in (3).
1.C Restaurant categories and prices on Foursquare
As discussed in section 2, I construct variables of foreign presence and of wealth in a
voting precincts from the Foursquare data.
As an indication of the presence of foreigners in the area, I use the presence of Turkish
and Middle Eastern restaurants. The scatterplot Figure 1.C.1 shows how this measure
correlates, on the level of city districts where official data is avaiable, how the number of
such restaurants is correlated with the percentage of inhabitants who are foreigners.
Figure 1.C.2 shows how on the same level, average real estate prices (per square meter)
correlate with the average price ratings received by foursquare places. These correlations
are positive as we would expect. It is strong (.82) in the case of the ethnic restaurants, but
a bit weaker in the case of price ratings (.59).
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Figure 1.C.1: Foreign population and foreign restaurants on Foursquare by district
Figure 1.C.2: Real estate prices and Foursquare price ratings by district
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Chapter 2
The Demand Effect of Immigration:
Refugees and Employment in Germany
The 2014-2015 refugee crisis led to a sharp and unexpected increase in immigration to Germany,
particularly from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. While few of the immigrants have found employ-
ment, refugees receive social security payments and access local services in the areas where they
settle. The arrival of refugee immigrants in a community therefore represents an unexpected de-
mand shock. I exploit the fact that settlement of refugees in Germany was managed to create novel
instruments for the arrival of refugees in a given region. Firstly, German federal states used dif-
ferent rules for the internal allocation of refugees, and secondly, the availability of vacant housing
was an important factor. I find that immigration increased native employment growth by about 6
percent annually between 2014 and 2017; these gains are just as high for non-university educated
workers and occur especially in the service sectors most likely to benefit from the demand shock.
Despite this, I find some evidence that refugee immigration has led to increased electoral support
for the anti-immigration AfD party.
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2.1 Introduction
The arrival in Germany of war refugees from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries
has received considerable attention in recent years. Given their high numbers – more
than 150,000 in 2014, and around one million in 2015 – these immigrants represent a
challenge for the German administration and larger society. This challenge has been met
at times with a welcoming attitude, at others with concerns about crime, integration and
the impact of these new arrivals on local labor markets.
By the end of 2016, only about 50,000 (or 5%) of these immigrants had found a job
in Germany, suggesting that displacement effects on native workers, if any, are limited
(the number has grown to above 200,000 by the end of 2017). However, this makes it
possible to investigate in isolation the impact that immigration can have on local demand,
for example in services such as retail and restaurants. In 2016 and 2017, the German
government spent almost 20 billion Euros annually, or 0.5% of GDP, on stipends for
refugees as well as related expenses such as teaching, construction of shelters and public
administration.
At least in the short run, the management of the immigration wave has therefore acted
as an unintended employment stimulus for German nationals. The German Employment
Agency and the associated research institute IAB reported in 2016 that ca. 50.000 new
jobs directly related to the refugee influx have been generated (Arbeitsmarkt, 2016).
This paper investigates these effects of the refugee crisis on local employment, eco-
nomic development and political outcomes. It exploits a natural experiment arising from
the fact that the refugee crisis was partially managed. Refugees were not allowed to set-
tle wherever they wanted, but were distributed across Germany to the 16 Federal States,
then to administrative districts and finally to communes and municipalities. Local popu-
lation size was the most important determinant of how many refugees were to settle in a
given area, but certain federal states also considered tax income, surface area, and foreign
population when allocating refugees. This paper exploits these differences in dispersal
policies to create an instrument for refugee settlement. In practice, the availability of suit-
able housing for refugees also evolved as an important determinant directing the flow of
immigrants. I use this constraint as a second instrument.
I demonstrate that both instruments affect the number of immigrants settling in a given
region significantly, and only during the years of the refugee crisis. Furthermore, immi-
gration as well as other outcomes such as employment and GDP growth are not affected
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by these variables before the refugee crisis.
I find that the immigration wave had a significant positive impact on employment of
native workers. Employment growth was boosted by roughly 6 percent annually (0.1
percentage points) over the period of the immigration wave. Workers without a university
education benefited strongly, consistent with the finding that most of the effect was felt in
service sectors such as construction, retail, hospitality and some public services.
Additionally, and despite these short-term benefits for local employment from refugee
immigration, I find limited evidence that areas receiving more refugees voted more strongly
for the anti-immigrant AfD party in the 2017 federal elections.
The literature studying the impact of immigration on local employment has mostly
focused on how the labour supply shock leads to the displacement of native workers. Card
(1990) finds no significant effect on total local employment, while Card (2001) and Borjas
(2003) find a moderate negative effect. Ottaviano and Peri (2012) find a positive effect on
native wages, arguing that immigrants are imperfect substitutes for native employees, who
move to more productive occupations. However, they find immigration to be detrimental
to previous immigrants. Borjas and Monras (2017) investigate several refugee waves
from the 1960s to the 1990s, coming to the conclusion that they can hurt low-skilled
native employees, but also benefit complimentary workers. Clemens and Hunt (2017)
try to reconcile the findings from several studies that look at these same refugee supply
shocks, and confirm that the negative impacts are rather small.
Moving to the German context, Dustmann et al. (2017) demonstrate the negative em-
ployment and wage impact of cross-country commuting along the Czech border. Since
the commuting workers do not consume in Germany but rather at the (Czech) location
of their homes, this natural experiment provides a compliment to the one I study in this
paper, isolating a labour supply shock without increased demand from immigrants. In my
case, there is a very limited labour supply shock but strong demand from immigrants due
to government assistance, leading to a positive ’stimulus’ effect on certain sectors.
This positive effect of immigration on local service sectors is also present in Hong
and McLaren (2015), and in Cengiz and Tekguc (2017) who study the immigration of
Syrian refugees to Turkey. In their paper, the demand generated by immigrants is coming
directly from the immigrant workers themselves, rather than from Government assistance
as during the refugee crisis.
Refugee immigrations and the dispersal policies used to house immigrants have been
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exploited in several recent papers. Glitz (2012) and Foged and Peri (2016) both also
investigate the impact on native employment. They look at immigration waves during the
1990 - ethnic Germans coming to Germany from the former Soviet republic in the case of
Glitz (2012), and refugees entering Denmark from a variety of origin countries in the case
of Foged and Peri (2016). These papers argue that the dispersal policies were independent
from labor market conditions and that the resulting distribution can therefore be taken as
quasi-random. Glitz shows a moderate negative impact on native employment, while
Foged and Peri find that immigration pushed native workers into more cognitively and
communicatively demanding jobs, ultimately benefiting them (Peri and Sparber (2009)
makes a similar argument while investigating Mexican immigration to the US).
In contrast to these papers, I show that despite the intention to disperse refugees equally
during the 2014-2015 crisis, the distribution of refugees across Germany ex-post is quite
strongly influenced by pull-factors of immigration. My use of the instrumental variable
approach discussed above, which exploits the management of refugee flows more explic-
itly, therefore provides a methodological alternative. I also contrast my approach with
the commonly used strategy of instrumenting immigration with the size of pre-existing
communities.
Besides Cengiz and Tekguc (2017), there are a few other working papers studying the
effect of the current refugee crisis. For Germany, Gehrsitz and Ungerer (2017) present
an analysis of immigration and a number of relevant outcomes (including employment),
noting that the frantic management of the crisis introduced randomness in the distribution
of refugees. Steinmayr (2016) studies voting outcomes in Austria, using the availability
of mass accommodations as an instrument; this strategy has similarities to my use of
housing variables. Further afield, Ceritoglu et al. (2017) study labor market outcomes in
Turkey, using geographical distance to Syria to differentiate between treated and untreated
districts.
The organization of the paper is as follows: section 2 explains the institutional back-
ground as well as data sources, and gives summaries of the raw data; section 3 and 4
present the empirical specifications and results respectively. Section 5 provides robust-
ness checks, while section 6 concludes. The appendices provide a theoretical model moti-
vating the investigation of different sectors of employment as well as an exploration of the
network instrument as a source of variation. Another appendix investigates how voting
outcomes during the 2017 federal election were influenced by the immigration wave.
66
2.2 Institutions and Data
2.2.1 Data
I use mainly German administrative data, published on the level of administrative dis-
tricts. The 402 administrative districts (295 rural and 107 urban) do not always form
labor markets; often, an urban district and its surrounding rural district should be seen
as one market instead. The Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning provides
a key by which we can aggregate the districts into labor markets which are defined by
commuting patterns1. I use this definition to form my basic regional unit of observations,
the labor market region (LMR).
The data on immigration by origin country is available from the foreigners registry,
which includes the number of foreign nationals, male and female, by nationality and type
of residence permit, for each of the administrative districts. Especially during the refugee
crisis 2014-16, there was a lag in registrations because the responsible Foreigners Offices
were often overwhelmed. However, the numbers from the end of 2016 likely present a
realistic picture, and so the total difference in the register between 2014 and 2016 can be
taken as total immigration over this period.
Over these three years, the number of residents from the 8 most important non-European
refugee origin countries grew by 1.065 Million. These countries - often represented to-
gether in German statistics and official announcements - are Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan
and Pakistan as well as Somalia, Eritrea and Nigeria. The number of Syrians alone in-
creased by 580 Thousand, while that of Afghanis is second with 185 Thousand and Iraqis
third with 140 Thousand. These three countries together therefore represent 905 thousand
immigrants. I will focus on these in my analyses, since I only have detailed employment
numbers for these three countries and since they are a relatively homogeneous group with
respect to education and cultural background (more so than when e.g. the African or
Balkan immigrants were also taken into account). There was also an important immi-
gration from the Balkan countries of Albania, Serbia, Macedonia and Kosovo around the
same time, but these immigrants are unlikely to be granted asylum status and unlikely to
stay in Germany.
As can be seen in figure 2.2.1, the increase of the registered population from the three
main origin countries during 2014-2016 dwarfs immigration during the preceding years.
1For a reference, see Raumabgrenzungen (2015).
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Figure 2.2.1:
The highest increase occurs in 2016, and not in 2015 - this is because of the backlog in
registrations, since the foreigners offices were overwhelmed by the immigration wave in
2015. The numbers shown here refer to foreigners registered at their place of residence,
rather than the number of foreigners entering Germany, which is why the increase appears
only with a delay.
Distribution keys
The federal states of Germany decide how to distribute refugees to administrative districts.
When doing so, most only consider the population of each district, but North Rhine-
Westphalia (NRW) and Brandenburg take the area of a district into account, and Hesse
the share of foreigners in the population; Bavaria tends to assign a higher share of asylum
seekers to urban rather than to rural districts, relative to population. These distribution
keys were created in the late 1990s or early 2000s, so they cannot have anticipated the
current conditions.2
2The ultimate source of the different distribution keys are the directives issued by the federal states. An
overview is given in Geis and Orth (2016).
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This gives rise to a situation where two urban or rural districts, which are otherwise
similar in population, area, economic development etc., are allocated different numbers
of asylum applicants, because their federal states use different distribution keys. A Bavar-
ian city would receive more than one located in Baden-Württemberg, which uses a simple
population-based key, while a city in Hesse or NRW would receive fewer. The refugees
have hard incentives to remain in the location where they were first assigned, since they
receive a stipend from the local authorities which is conditional on their place of resi-
dence.
On average, a district in NRW, Bavaria, Hesse or Brandenburg is supposed to receive
9.1% more or fewer asylum seekers than they would with a hypothetical distribution key
that considers only population. For the year of 2015, this often means a difference of sev-
eral hundred immigrants. Figure 1 shows a map of German districts coloured according
to this relative difference,
keyi =
Nkeyi − N popi
N popi
(2.1)
where Nkeyi is the number of asylum seekers a district i is supposed to accommodate
according to the key used in its federal state, and N popi is the number it would be supposed
to accommodate if a pure population key was used. The quantity keyi, interacted with
time dummies for the years of the refugee immigration, is the main instrument I use in
my analyses. 3 If we multiply this difference Nkeyi − N popi with the number of refugees
arriving in the federal state j of which i is part, we get the number of excess refugees that
the district receives due to the idiosyncratic distribution key,
excess_re fi = (N
key
i − N popi ) × N j
N j is the actual number of refugees arriving in the federal state.
This difference is zero in most states, where a pure population key is used. The city
states of Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen do not have the same administrative subdivisions.
The variation for an econometric analysis comes from the 193 districts in NRW, Bavaria,
Hesse and Brandenburg.
3the map has not been updated; in an updated map, the districts of the state of Brandenburg would also
appear coloured
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Figure 2.2.2: Labour market regions with non-zero distribution key difference, relative to
population key
2.2.2 Actual distribution of refugees and housing availability
The true distribution of refugees ex-post does not show equal numbers of refugees per
inhabitants within states, even when this was intended according to distribution key. In
my data, the range of the population increase is from zero in one labour market region
(Osterode) to 3.5 per hundred inhabitants (Gießen). The mean is 1.2 immigrants per hun-
dred inhabitants, while most LMR receive between .8 and 1.5 , as shown in the histogram
Figure 2.2.3. Larger LMR tend to receive more refugees even on a per capita basis, and
so do more prosperous ones. There is also a clear regional pattern, as can be seen in the
map Figure 2.2.4. The north-west has generally accommodated more immigrants than
particularly the former Eastern German states. This is partially due to the distribution key
we discussed earlier, but it also points to political factors playing a role.
A strong predictor of immigration is the size of the pre-existing community of the
same nationality. Figure 2.2.5 shows in a scatter plot the positive and linear relationship
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Figure 2.2.3:
between log community size in 2013 and log immigration 2014-2016, for the three main
nationalities. The well-known "pull"-factors of immigration clearly play a role in the
distribution of refugees in Germany.
I use the availability of suitable housing for refugees, in particular the number of empty
apartments in communal ownership, as another exogenous source of regional variation in
the number of immigrants.
The difficulty of housing refugees is often anecdotally cited as one of the main de-
terminants of where they were eventually accommodated. An early investigation by the
German newspaper Die Zeit, for example, notes that deviations from the prescriptive dis-
tribution keys are common, due to pull factors but also to the availability of empty apart-
ments4. The Financial Times noted on September 19, 2017: "Refugees tend to be sent to
regions with plentiful housing. But these are also places with higher unemployment and
lower-quality jobs", corroborating the mechanism I want to exploit but also addressing
the main identification challenge of using this instrument.
During the immigration crisis, some municipalities argued that they could accommo-
date no more newcomers due to the lack of facilities, while others actually volunteered
4http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2015-08/fluechtlinge-verteilung-quote
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Figure 2.2.4:
Figure 2.2.5:
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to take more than their share (based on population and distribution keys alone), because
they had e.g. municipality owned mass accommodation facilities that could be used.
Many municipalities built refugee shelters, especially the city states of Berlin and Ham-
burg, while others appropriated e.g. school gyms and event halls for emergency accom-
modation. In the longer run however, the refugees are supposed to be housed in regular
apartments, and by the end of 2016 this was mostly achieved. It is no surprise then that the
number of vacant apartments, and of vacant apartments in public ownership especially,
strongly influenced the destination of immigrants.
The data on apartments is taken from the latest census, in 2011 (this also avoids the
possibility of communities strategically building, buying or selling publicly owned hous-
ing to influence the number of refugees arriving). Of course, larger LMR have more
empty apartments (the correlation coefficient between population and number of empty
apartments is 0.81); however, since there is a lot of heterogeneity in municipal policies
with respect to public ownership of housing assets, the correlation between population
and community owned empty apartments is only weak (correlation coefficient of 0.25).
On average, there are 7000 empty apartments per LMR, and 685 empty apartments in
communal ownership (at the time of the 2011 census). From these numbers, I construct
the main cross-sectional part of my second instrument, the number of empty apartments
per person:
eappi =
empty_apartments2011censusi
total_population2011censusi
Before the refugee crisis, neither the number of empty apartments nor of empty apart-
ments in communal ownership impacts immigration from the three most important refugee
countries (or from the other countries). During the crisis, the impact is quite significant.
We will discuss this when we discuss our main results and their robustness in sections 2.4
and 2.6.
The mean of eappi is .025 with a standard deviation of .014. That is, there is roughly
one empty apartment for 40 people. The distribution of this variable can be seen in figure
2.2.6; it shows quite a bit of variety, having many values that can be said to be significantly
above average.
It must be noted that these variables show some geographical correlation across Ger-
many. In general, the Federal States in former Eastern Germany have more empty apart-
ments per person (the pattern is even stronger with commune owned apartments). This is
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Figure 2.2.6:
Figure 2.2.7: Labour market regions by within-state decile of empty apartments per per-
son
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Figure 2.2.8:
one of the reasons why I use state-by-year fixed effects for all of my specifications; this
means that the effect I show is not the simple effect of empty apartments per person, but
of empty apartments relative to other LMR in the same federal state.
This is important for another reason: the federal states differ in their treatment of
refugees. Not only do they receive different numbers of refugees per person according
to the federal distribution key, but many policies relevant for labor market access, support
and integration of refugees are decided on the level of the state. For example, states decide
who is responsible for managing the stipend to refugees - communes or municipalities,
or the state itself. Since the police is also a state responsibility, everything relating to
policy enforcement also varies from state to state. Thus, some states enforce repatriation
of immigrants whose asylum request has been denied, while others do not.
The map Figure 2.2.8 shows empty apartments per person and immigrants per person
to the LMR next to each other. However, it shows within-state deciles of both variables
rather than absolute numbers; this removes the state fixed effects and therefore provides a
better graphical representation of what will be our main first-stage regression. As you can
see from the map, LMR which have many empty apartments relative to the state average
also tend to receive more refugee immigrants (again, relative to the state average) during
the years of 2014-16.
As we have discussed, the size of the pre-existing same origin community has often
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been used to instrument for the arrival of new immigrants. Appendix 2.A of this paper
provides an exploration of this possible instrument, arguing that it is difficult to use in the
context considered here. I show that indeed, the network size influences the number of
new immigrants, but less so during the crisis years of 2014-2016 than before. On the other
hand, regions with strong such networks followed different trends e.g. in unemployment
before the refugee wave. In particular, the interactions of a variable indicating the network
size with year dummies positively correlate with the change in unemployment, in some
years significantly so.
Here, I also use data on the gender composition of immigrants, as well as what type of
residence permit they hold (as of Dec. 2016). The impact of the size of the pre-existing
community on the share of newcomers who are female is not significant. However, when
we look at the share who hold the residence permit which is most tightly linked with
asylum - the permit for reasons of international law, humanitarian or political considera-
tions, as opposed to any other permit or a suspension of deportation - it is slightly higher
where the network is stronger. This suggests that either there is a selection effect by which
"true refugees" rather than economic immigrants tend to seek out stronger networks com-
munities, or that this community actually helps them obtain the more favorable kind of
residence permit, allowing them to expect a more secure stay in Germany. Both could
confound an analysis relying on this instrument.
2.2.3 Government spending on refugees
Government expenditure on benefits from the asylum seekers act in Germany were 9.5
Billion Euro in 2016, up from 1.5 Billion in 2013 (2014: 2.4 Billion, 2015: 5.3 Billion).
The act pays for a stipend and e.g. housing expenses and other basic needs, all of which
directly benefit the asylum seekers. It is administered locally, meaning on the level of
the district or (in some states) communes; however, since 2015, the federal government
has refunded local administrations for these expenses (the totals on expenses as well as
breakdowns into varying types come from a report of the German Ministry of Finance
(BMF 2017) and a study by the FiFo Institute of the University of Cologne (FiFo Institute
2016)). After an asylum request has been granted, refugees benefit from social security
transfers like the native population. In 2016, such transfers to the newly arrived refugees
totaled 1.7 Billion Euro; this amount is expected to grow as asylum requests are being
processed, while payments through the asylum seekers act would fall.
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Table 2.2.1: Federal Spending 2016
Spending due to Asylum policies Euros, Billion
Total federal spending 21.7
- Refunds to local governments (for payments from refugee seekers act) 9.5
- Combating causes of displacement** 7.1
- Registration, administration and accommodation in temp. shelters 1.4
- Integration efforts (incl. language courses) 2.1
- Social security after asylum request 1.7
Source: Federal Ministry of Finance, 2017
**International spending
Spending through the refugee seekers act is usually accounted as district government
spending, even if it is refunded by the federal government. However, local government
expenditures have not yet been widely released for the year of 2016. It is available only
until 2014 in all states; some states independently publish more recent figures. For other
states, it is not yet feasible to directly show how the immigration has influenced local
government spending. Therefore, in this version of the paper, I have to rely on (invariant)
individual spending, i.e. how much districts are required to spend on individual refugees
by law, and assume that we can take these figures as true expenditure in 2014-16.
Expenditure on each individual amount to about 1000 Euros per month and person,
whether through social security transfers or through the asylum seekers act; the FiFo In-
stitute report estimates that total expenses per asylum seeker and month are 1063 Euro
(including costs of education, which are born by the state rather than the federal govern-
ment), while they are 1023 Euro for persons benefiting from regular social security (SGB
II), such as refugees who’s request has been granted. These numbers tally well with the
total costs reported by the Ministry of Finance; if we assume that about a thousand euros
were payed per month on each of 900 thousand refugees, it would be a total of 10.8 Bil-
lion Euros; the totals provided by the Ministry of Finance add up to roughly 10 Billion, 8
Billion through the refugee seekers act + 1.7 Billion through social security. The differ-
ence can likely be explained by the fact that not all refugees started receiving benefits in
January 2016; a few would only arrive in 2016, while others had arrived in late 2015 but
not handed in their asylum requests.
Other expenses associated with the refugees include funds spent for registration, ad-
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ministration and accommodation in temporary shelters as well as efforts to facilitate in-
tegration, which includes the language classes and cultural training (’welcome classes’).
These together accounts for 3.5 Billion Euros in 2016 (see Table 2.2.1). Since some of
these costs (e.g. the integration classes) are paid directly by the federal government rather
than paid by local governments and refunded, it will be even more difficult to obtain ex-
act numbers on where this money was spent. The assumption that the local share of this
spending is simply the local share of the refugees is therefore harder to substantiate.
The second largest part of total spending does not have a direct benefit on the German
economy at all: funds for combating the causes of displacement are more similar to for-
eign aid. They include e.g. payments to improve security and livelihoods in Syria and for
border enforcement in Turkey.
The data available at the moment is not ideal, but the legal requirements as well as our
analysis of the states that do provide local breakdowns on spending suggest that within
states, where the money is spent follows the pattern of migration closely. For rough
estimates of how the demand increase affected employment, I will therefore assume in
the following that a refugee brings an increase in spending on housing, consumption,
health and education of around 1000 Euros a month. To this we can add the costs not
covered by the refugee seekers act or by social security, namely the 3.5 Billion Euros
spend on teaching and public administration as well as temporary shelters. Since in the
total, this amounts to a quarter of the total domestic expenditure, this translated to 250
Euros per person and month.
2.2.4 Employment of natives and immigrants across sectors
The data on employment by nationality is provided by the German Employment Agency.
I use yearly data going back to 2007 and up until 2017. In my main specifications, I use
one-year leads of employment changes as outcome variables, owing to the fact that hiring
requires some time. 2017 employment changes are thus regressed on 2016 immigration
etc. Additionally, I have data on employment by nationality for each sector for 4 years,
namely for 2007, 2010, 2013 and 2016. I use these for the explorations of specific sectors.
As we will see, the impact in these sectors was felt more instantaneously, so that the
effects are significant already in 2016. 5 The available data enables me to use panel data
estimation in all my main specifications.
5The same breakdown for 2017 was not yet available at the time of writing this version.
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Figure 2.2.9:
The employment situation in Germany steadily improved during the 10 years under
study. But across LMR, there is a lot of variation in employment change (figure 2.2.9).
Over the three years of 2013 and 2016, the mean employment change was by 4.3 percent,
with a minimum of -.89 and a maximum of 11.9 percent.
I use employment numbers for Germans and for Syrians, Iraqis and Afghanis, either
separately or aggregated. I have a partition of these employment numbers into 17 sec-
tors, of which I define several as likely to benefit directly from the demand generated
by refugees: retail and hospitality. Three more sectors could benefit from expenditure re-
lated to the management of immigration, namely construction, education and other public
administration.6
The most important sector to employ workers from the three origin countries is hos-
pitality/restaurants. On average, 21% of these immigrant employees in a labor market
region work in this sector. This is followed by manufacturing (14%), healthcare (12%)
and commerce (10% - these relative numbers are from 2013, before the immigration wave,
6It should be noted that for some sectors in some LMR, the employment data provided to me was
censored/anonymized. This was the case when there were only two or fewer firms active in that sector/LMR.
These sectors simply do not appear in my empirical regressions.
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Figure 2.2.10: C: Manufacturing, G: Commerce, I: Hospitality, health: Healthcare
but do not change much over time). There is however a lot of heterogeneity across labor
market regions in these shares. Figure 2.2.10 shows how the share of employees in these
main sectors is distributed across LMRs.
While, as we have noted, the size of the population and the total number of workers
from the three origin countries strongly influence immigration during the refugee crisis,
these employment shares seem unrelated with new arrivals. For example, a region where
most Syrian workers are employed in manufacturing does not attract more or fewer im-
migrants than one where most are in hospitality or healthcare, conditional on the total
number of Syrians. These employment shares also do not affect selection to the (very lim-
ited) extend that we can investigate it (that is, they do not affect the share of immigrants
who are women or the share who have their asylum request approved). The regressions
supporting this are shown in the appendix.
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2.3 Empirical strategy
2.3.1 Instrumental variable strategy - distribution keys, housing, im-
migration and employment
The main difficulties in studying the impact of the refugee immigration on labor markets
are the possibilities of reverse causality and joint determination: the processes driving
employment changes could also determine where the immigrants settle, and of course, the
expectation of positive labor market developments is a pull-factor in itself. This section
details our strategy to address these issues.
The timing of the refugee crisis follows the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars, and other Mid-
dle Eastern and African conflicts. It can therefore be said that it is exogenous to local
labor market conditions in Germany. However, simply using the arrival of refugees in
Germany as an instrument for local refugee immigration would not suffice, as it does not
give us any variation between German labor markets.
We are interested in the impact of immigration on native employment changes, and
therefore ultimately in a specification such as:
δLDEi,t = β Iit + ΓXit + FEi + FEt,r + i,t (2.2)
δLDEi,t is our outcome variable, the percentage change in German employment growth
in labor market region i at time t, overall or in specific sectors. The main exploratory
variable is Iit, the number of new immigrations in the region per person (the difference
between the old and new population size, normalized by the population size of the region).
The obvious problem would be that there are other changes over time that affect em-
ployment trends, which could be correlated with immigration because they also fall in the
crisis years of 2014-2016, or because they directly affect where immigrants settle.
We have seen that the differences in distribution keys and the availability of suitable
housing has created exogenous variation in how many refugees arrive in a district dur-
ing the crisis - we will exploit this as the required variation across regions. Thus, we
can introduce time fixed effects to flexibly accommodate changing employment trends in
Germany. Our first stage and second stage estimation equations become
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δLDEi,t = β Iit + ΓXit + FEi + FEt,r + i,t (2.3)
Ii,t = α (Tt × keyi) + ΓXit + FEi + FEt,r + i,t (2.4)
where keyi is the number of refugees allocated to a region above or below what a pure
population key would prescribe, as defined in 2.1. Tt is a treatment dummy taking the
value of 1 during the crisis years. The instrument Tt×keyi varies by year and region. Using
Tt, the (exogenous) refugee immigration to Germany (in millions, so that is is roughly
one in 2014-2016) provides the time variation in the explanatory variable. The region
fixed effects FEi control for important characteristics such a region’s total population and
pre-existing population from the refugee origin countries. Xit is a set of time varying
controls at the level of the labor market region, such as GDP growth, population growth
and (potentially) political variables.
The time fixed effects FEt,r are allowed to vary by Federal State. This allows us to
account for the various institutional differences between states discussed before, which
affect both immigration and labour market outcomes.
As an alternative, we can use a continuous variable IDEt which is total immigration into
Germany, rather than the indicator taking the value of 1 during the crisis years and zero
during other years. As we will see (in section 6, robustness), this does not have an impact
on our estimates, which is to be expected since the number of arrivals is so much higher
in 2014-2016 than before that using a dummy is just as good as this continuous variable.
This specification is similar to a difference-in-difference strategy in that it compares
regions which receive more or fewer refugees due to the specific distribution key of their
federal state as ’treated’ areas, during the time of the refugee crisis relative to the time
before. Immigration is affected by the distribution key and housing variables only dur-
ing the crisis; if they are jointly determined with labor market trends, the region fixed
effects address this issue. This assumes that while the instrument may be correlated with
time-invariant individual characteristics (and possibly individual linear time trends), it is
independent from time-varying shocks.
In an additional specification, we will not focus on the total employment change by re-
gion, but at specific sectors and how they are impacted by immigration. This is motivated
by the fact that some sectors benefit from the demand generated by the immigrants. The
specification therefore becomes
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δLDEi,t,s = β1 Iit + β2 Iit × DDs + ΓXit + FEi + FEt + FEs + i,t,s (2.5)
Ii,t = α (Tt × keyi) + ΓXit + FEi + FEt + FEs + i,t,s (2.6)
where Li,t,s is sectoral employment, rather than total employment in a region. DDs is a
dummy taking the value one if sector s is likely to benefit from the demand generated by
the specific need of the refugees - I simply used those sectors mentioned by the head of
the federal employment agency’s research institute, quoted in the introduction - construc-
tion, teaching, security and public administration. The coefficient β2 thus measures the
different impact that immigration to a region has on those sectors, compared to all other
sectors. Immigration to the region is still instrumented as before, namely by the first stage
equation 2.6.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Demand effect of immigration
I will first present the results of the OLS regressions specified in equations 2.3 and 2.5.
The variable of interest, immigration, is in these first regression the change in the popula-
tion from the three most important refugee origin countries, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan,
relative to the regions’s population. The outcome variable is the percentage change in
employed persons of German nationality in the labor market region. It is allowed to be
different for German individuals without a university degree.
The results are presented in table 2.4.1. Surprisingly, immigration is not correlated with
this outcome variable in the OLS specification (1), when region fixed effects and region
time trends are taken into account. This is possibly due to the fact that some of the factors
attracting refugees, such as a pre-existing community, where less present in such regions
that experienced above trend employment growth in the crisis years. However, we can not
make any causal claims or rule out an effect, because of the endogeneity of immigration.
The results of the first stage regression of immigration on our instruments - the inter-
action of a time dummy for the years of the refugee crisis with the distribution keys and
with available housing, are presented in table 2.4.2.
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Table 2.4.1: Immigration and employment change in percent, OLS
Employment change
Immigrants (per hundred inhabitants) -1.140 -2.641
(21.367) (19.763)
Region FE Yes Yes
Type × year FE Yes Yes
State × year FE Yes Yes
r2 0.1 0.17
N 2290 1782
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***.
The coefficient of roughly 0.05 means that a region with a distribution key of +1 would
receive .05 more refugees per person during the crisis years than one with a value of
zero (where the distribution key is exactly the regions share of the state’s population). As
discussed before, the mean absolute value of the distribution key is close to 0.1 – a region
with a value of 0.1 would receive 0.005 more refugees per person. Since the baseline
mean is one refugee per 100 inhabitants (0.01 per person), the distribution key leads to
an increase of 50% over the counterfactual scenario in which the region has a distribution
key value of zero, like the regions in the majority of states where only population is taken
into account. This suggests that the states and regions over-comply significantly with the
differences dictated by distribution key differences, where they exist.7
The coefficient of 0.04 on the second instrument means that during the refugee crisis,
one additional empty apartment per 100 inhabitants meant roughly 0.04 additional immi-
grants per person. The average number of empty apartments per 100 persons in a labor
market is about 2.5, with a standard deviation of 1.4, and the number of immigrants per
100 persons is 1. A region with a number of empty apartments which is one standard de-
viation above the mean would therefore receive 1.14 immigrants per hundred inhabitants,
or about 14% more than average. Taken together, this shows that the instrument explains
quite a bit of the variation in immigration.
Note that the region fixed effects and the state-by-year fixed effects together explain
7beyond overcompliance, there could also be path dependencies in where the refugees settle, magnifying
initially small differences over time.
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much of the remaining variation, as the R-squared is quite high.
Table 2.4.2: First stage: distribution keys, empty apartments and immigration
Immigrants per person
Crisis × distribution key 0.0551** 0.0459* 0.0323
(0.025) (0.027) (0.025)
Crisis × empty apmnts. 0.0377** 0.0421** 0.0336**
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region × time trends Yes
State × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
r2 0.756 0.749 0.761 0.785
N 2301 2303 2301 2301
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***.
Also of interest is the simple reduced form regression of our outcome variable on the
instrument. The results of these regressions are presented in table 2.4.3. The coefficients
are positive and, for the apartment instrument, weakly significant.
Finally we come to the estimates from the full IV regressions as specified in Equations
2.3 (second stage) and 2.4 (first stage) in table 2.4.4. I use both instruments alone in spec-
ification (1) and (2), and together in my preferred specification (3). This last specification
allows us to exploit both instruments together, and the estimates are more precise as a re-
sult. The coefficient of immigrants per person on total percentage employment indicates
that one immigrant more per 100 inhabitants would raise employment growth of German
nationals by around 6% in the following year. Since annual employment growth during
the crisis years was about 2%, this amounts to .12 percentage points of additional growth
per year due to the refugee crisis.
A similar picture emerges when only employment of the less educated is considered
(i.e. the non-university educated). Employment growth for this group was 4.3% higher in
regions that receive one refugee more per 100 inhabitants (table 2.4.5).
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Table 2.4.3: Instruments and employment change in percent, OLS
Outcome variable Employment change, German nationals
Model (1) Key difference IV (2) Appartments IV (3) both IV
Distribution keys 13.08 5.986
(16.242) (16.794)
Empty apmnts. 35.81** 36.08**
(15.152) (15.344)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Region × time trends Yes Yes Yes
State × year FE Yes Yes Yes
r2 0.0968 0.0977 0.0967
N 2290 2299 2290
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***.
Table 2.4.4: Refugee immigration and employment change in percent, IV
Outcome variable Employment change, German nationals
Model (1) Key difference IV (2) Appartments IV (3) both IV
Immigrants (per hundred
inhabitants)
2.3 7.2* 6.3**
(3.0) (3.9) (3.1)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Region × time trends Yes Yes Yes
State × year FE Yes Yes Yes
F statistic 14.8 61.2 35.9
N 2290 2290 2290
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***.
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Table 2.4.5: Refugee immigration and employment change in percent, IV (less educated)
Outcome variable Employment change, less educated German nationals
Model (1) Key difference IV (2) Appartments IV (3) both IV
Immigrants (per hundred
inhabitants)
4.3 4.3* 4.3**
(3.0) (2.5) (2.1)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Region × time trends Yes Yes Yes
State × year FE Yes Yes Yes
F statistic 13.1 52.9 31.2
N 2290 2290 2290
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***.
2.4.2 Employment in specific sectors
Immigration could impact different industries differently - for example, we expect a pos-
itive impact in those sectors that expanded to manage the immigration, such as construc-
tion, teaching, security and administration. Using the specification in equations 2.5 and
2.6, we allow the coefficient on our variable of interest (immigrants to the region per per-
son) to be different for those sectors. The results from this regression are presented in
table 2.4.6.
As discussed earlier, I only have the breakdown for employment by sector and nation-
ality for four years - 2007, 2010, 2013 and 2016, while in the main analysis presented
above, I use yearly data and the last year of employment data is 2017. The panel is there-
fore shorter, and I aggregate refugee immigration as my main explanatory variable across
these three-year periods.
Using sectoral data from this shorter time period, we find an insignificant main effect
of immigration on employment (even if the coefficient is of a similar magnitude as in the
main analysis). However, in the case of sectors benefiting from local demand, the coeffi-
cient is larger and significant. This suggests that indeed, these are the sectors especially
benefiting from refugee immigration.
We take this as evidence for the hypothesis that it is the spending associated with
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refugees which lead to the increase in employment.
Table 2.4.6: Immigration and employment change in percent, IV - local demand
(1) log emp. growth (both IV)
Immigrants (per hundred inhabitants) 4.31
(16.54)
Immigrants × local demand 6.79**
(2.85)
Region FE Yes
Region × time trends Yes
State × year FE Yes
Sector FE
F
N 11643
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***.
2.4.3 Government spending and the GDP multiplier
Given tour hypothesis that it is the additional government spending of roughly 1 Thousand
Euros per refugee per year that led to the positive employment effect, we also expect
GDP growth to be positively affected. However, when we simply use GDP growth as an
outcome variable in our main regression, we do not see a significant impact (see table
2.4.7).
Another possible way of analyzing the effect of additional government is to run a mul-
tiplier regression, assuming that additional government spending on refugees is around
1 Thousand Euros per person (the expenses required by the asylum seekers act, see the
above section on Government spending). The empirical specification for my multiplier
regression is
Yit − Yit−1
Yit−1
= β
Git −Git−1
Yit−1
+ FEi + FEt,r + i,t (2.7)
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Table 2.4.7: Refugee immigration and GDP growth, IV
Outcome variable GDP growth
Model (1) Key difference IV (2) Appartments IV (3) both IV
Immigrants (per hundred
inhabitants)
0.2 0.03 0.05
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Region × time trends Yes Yes Yes
State × year FE Yes Yes Yes
F statistic 4.1 18.6 10.7
N 2290 2290 2290
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***.
The increase in government spending Git − Git−1 is approximated by the increase re-
quired by law given the number of asylum seekers during a year; then, I instrument it as
before with our two instruments.
The coefficient β is interpreted as the government spending multiplier; if it is above
one, the spending triggers other economic activity, while a multiplier below one indicates
that the spending crowds out such activity.
But in the specification using both instrumental variables, the β coefficient is insignif-
icant as before. Given the large standard error, we cannot conclude anything from its
value. This may be due to the fact that, at the time of writing, GDP data is only available
until 2016, and not as in the case of employment until 2017. It is also possible that the
increase in spending is badly approximated when we simply assume that it follows the
asylum seeker immigrant numbers, even though it is legally required to do so.
2.5 2017 Federal Elections in Germany
Immigration can also affect attitudes of the native population towards immigrants and to-
wards parties opposing immigration, something that may be reflected in voting outcomes.
The empirical strategy developed in this paper can in principle also be applied to this
question.
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Table 2.4.8: Immigration and employment change in percent, IV - local demand
(1) GDP growth, both IV
Government spending increase 1.3
(2.1)
Region FE Yes
Region × time trends Yes
State × year FE Yes
Sector FE
F 17.5
N 2275
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***.
To demonstrate this, I use voting outcomes for all German administrative districts in
the last three federal elections - 2009, 2013 and 2017. In the last of these, the refugee
crisis was one of the most important issues. A post-election survey of voters of the anti-
immigration AfD party revealed that 92% of respondents thought that "the (AfD) party
is mainly there to change the refugee policies with its initiatives", while 95% said that
they feared a loss of German culture.8 These responses show that far-right voters were
indeed worried about immigration, but it is an open question which effect direct exposure
to immigrants has on these attitudes.
Two recent papers studying this link are Otto and Steinhardt (2014) and Harmon (2017);
they document that local immigration increases the vote share of rightwing parties. Stein-
mayr (2016) on the other hand shows that during the same refugee crisis studied here,
proximity to refugee shelters lead to a decrease in the right-wing vote. These papers dis-
cuss the contact hypothesis, which proposes that contact with immigrants could reduce
prejudice and thereby right-wing voting. I use larger geographic units than either of these
papers, which means that my treatment is slightly different: from the perspective of the
German voter, it is not so much direct contact with the immigrants as the experience of
immigration to the larger region.
Studies of immigration and voting face the same problems of reverse causality as dis-
cussed in the context of labor market outcomes, since places with populations who are
8Infratest/dimap survey for the ARD, 24 Sept. 2017; link: https://wahl.tagesschau.de/wahlen/2017-09-
24-BT-DE/umfrage-afd.shtml
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less welcoming to immigrants may attract fewer of them in the first place. And since we
have seen that even during the crisis, such pull-factors still played a role in the destination
of refugees, my preferred specifications are again those that make use of the differences
in distribution keys as an instrumental variable.
Firstly, I use a similar empirical specification as before, namely
rightwingi,t = β Iit + FEi + FEt,r + i,t (2.8)
Ii,t = α (Tt × instrumenti) + FEi + FEt,r + i,t (2.9)
where the dependent variable rightwingi,t is the combined share of rightwing parties in
electoral district i at time t (or its logarithm in an alternative specification). Iit is refugee
immigration per 100 inhabitants as before, Tt is a time dummy taking the value 1 for the
period after the refugee crisis (2017) and instrumenti is the distribution key difference as
defined before.
There are reasons to think that the linear and additive fixed effects model may not be
appropriate in the German context. In particular, the AfD was founded only a few months
before the 2013 federal elections, and it started out with a different profile - less extreme
than its 2017 anti-immigrant incarnation. Other, older right-wing parties also never quite
had the platform of the 2017 AfD (the most prominent previous such party, the NPD, is
often described as neo-Nazi). Therefore, estimating fixed effects for the regions based on
previous AfD or NPD voteshares is difficult, because these parties did not make the same
political offering.
It may be more appropriate to use the logarithm of the right-wing voteshare as an out-
come variable. This assumes that fixed region- and year characteristics, as well as refugee
immigration to the region, impact the voteshare of right-wing parties in a multiplicative
rather than additive way. For example, a region giving 2.5% and 5% of the vote to right-
wing parties in 2009 and 2013 respective would give them 20% in 2017; in another region,
the respective voteshares would only be 1%, 2% and 8%.
In simple regressions of (1) the right-wing voteshare or (2) its logarithm on year and
region fixed effects, the second specification has the higher R-squared (.96 rather than .8
- see table 2.5.1). This is an indication that, indeed, the logarithmic specification is more
appropriate in the German context.
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Table 2.5.1: Additive vs. multiplicative fixed effects
Outcome (1) Right-wing voteshare (2) Log(Right-wing voteshare)
FE 2013 0.044*** 1.40***
(0.0) (0.1)
FE 2017 0.12*** 2.21***
(0.0) (0.0)
Region FE Yes Yes
R2 0.80 0.96
N 767 767
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***.
2.5.1 Results
The results from the panel regressions are reported in table 2.5.2. I find weak evidence
for a positive effect of refugee immigration on the vote share of right-wing parties. My
preferred IV specification (4) does give a positive point estimate that approaches signifi-
cance; it is also larger than the OLS estimate (3), which we indeed expect to be downward
biased due to the aforementioned reverse causality concerns. That the OLS estimate is
nevertheless positive may be partially due to the inclusion of several sets of fixed effects
- the raw correlation between refugee immigration and the right-wing voteshare (or its
logarithm) is negative (-.35).
2.5.2 Alternative specifications
The limited comparability of the election "menus" facing German voters before and after
the refugee crisis remains an important caveat for the interpretations of these results. To
relieve us of this problem, we can use a simple cross-sectional model rather than the fixed
effects model, and regress the vote share of the AfD in 2017 on immigration and suitable
demographic and socio-economic control variables.
a f di = β Ii + ΓXi + FEr + i (2.10)
Ii,t = α keydi f fi + ΓXi + FEr + i,t (2.11)
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Table 2.5.2: Immigration and voting, fixed effects
Outcome Right-wing voteshare Log(Right-wing voteshare)
Model (1) OLS (2) IV (3) OLS (4) IV
Refugees p. hundred inhabitants 0.010 0.07 0.09*** 0.3*
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.2)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 765 765 765 765
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***.
The outcome variable is now a f di, the vote share of the AfD party in 2017 (alternatively
the increase of this share from 2013 to 2017 - this does not change the results). The vector
of control variables Xi includes GDP per person, GDP growth, unemployment, population
and foreign population share, as well as a classification into urban, high-density rural and
low-density rural regions.
The results in these specification are insignificant, even if the magnitudes are similar to
those in the panel estimations (see table 2.5.3).
Table 2.5.3: Immigration and voting, demographic and economic controls
Model (1) OLS (2) IV
Refugees p. hundred inhabitants 0.01 0.008
(0.0) (0.3)
Share of foreigners -1.6 -1.6*
(1.0) (1.0)
Unemployment rate 10.0*** 10.0**
(1.8) (4.0)
Other control variables Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes
N 255 255
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***.
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2.5.3 Interactions
One question of interest concerns the heterogeneous effects of immigration on the pop-
ularity of right-wing parties. In particular, immigration could have a different impact
in areas which already have many immigrants, or in areas which have high unemploy-
ment. I test these hypotheses by interacting immigration, instrumented as before by the
distribution key differences, with the share of foreigners in the population and with the
unemployment rate.
The results are not significant (table 2.5.4). It is notable however that, in the IV specifi-
cations, the main coefficient is similar to before, while the coefficients on the interactions
have the sign we expect from the literature - a large pre-existing population of foreigners
diminishes the impact of immigration, while a high unemployment rate increases it.
Table 2.5.4: Immigration and voting, fixed effects
Outcome Log(Right-wing voteshare)
Model (1) OLS (2) IV (3) OLS (4) IV
Refugees p. hundred inhabitants 0.04 0.2 0.1 0.2
(0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.3)
Refugees × Share of foreigners 1.3 -6.0
(1.3) (5.8)
Refugees × Unemployment rate -0.8 5.7
(1.6) (12.9)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 765 765 765 765
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***.
The same is also true of the interactions of refugee immigration with the unemployment
rate and with the share of foreigners in the population (table 2.5.5).
In conclusion, using the same strategy employed in the main analysis of the paper, I
find weak evidence that the refugee immigration has contributed to the rise of right-wing
parties in Germany. My relatively large units of analysis do not allow me to pick up the
more local effects of direct exposure. It would be worthwhile to return to the question
with more granular and local observations.
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Table 2.5.5: Immigration and voting, demographic and economic controls, interactions
Model (1) OLS (2) IV
Refugees p. hundred inhabitants -0.02 0.0006
(0.0) (0.1)
Refugees × Unemployment rate 0.5 1.9
(0.4) (4.4)
Refugees × Share of foreigners 0.09 -0.5
(0.3) (2.2)
Share of foreigners -0.2 0.1
(0.2) (1.3)
Unemployment rate 0.8** -0.8
(0.4) (3.2)
Other control variables Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes
N 255 255
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***.
2.6 Robustness
2.6.1 Common Trends
The difference-in-differences instrumental variable (DDIV) strategy I use, which interacts
an exogenous time-varying variable with a possibly endogenous cross-sectional variable,
requires that the potential trends of both treatment and outcomes are independent from ac-
tual the value of the instrument. If the ’treatment’ group (i.e. regions with high value on
the cross-sectional variable) shows time trends which are different from the non-treatment
group during years when the time-treatment dummy is zero, then different outcomes dur-
ing years when this time-value is one cannot be interpreted as casual.9 In my case, I argue
that areas with non-zero values on the distribution key difference variable, and areas with
more or fewer vacant apartments would have had similar developments to other areas in
the absence of the immigration wave.
To address this concern, I will demonstrate that my cross-sectional instrumental vari-
9Jaeger et al. (2018) discusses instruments commonly used in the immigration literature along these
lines; Christian et al. (2017) similarly critiques a paper on food aid and conflict (Nunn and Qian, 2014).
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ables, both the distribution key differences and the number of empty apartments per per-
son, do not determine either immigration or outcome variables – unemployment trends,
GDP growth or GDP growth in sectors benefiting from refugee demand – in the period
prior to the refugee crisis. This shows that, in fact, the ’treatment’ and ’control’ areas did
follow common trends before the immigration wave. The regression specifications are
Ii,t = αt (instrumenti × YDt) + ΓXit + FEi + FEt,r + i,t (2.12)
and
δunempi,t = αt (instrumenti × YDt) + ΓXit + FEi + FEt,r + i,t (2.13)
GDPgrowthi,t = αt (instrumenti × YDt) + ΓXit + FEi + FEt,r + i,t (2.14)
GDPgrowthdemandi,t = αt (instrumenti × YDt) + ΓXit + FEi + FEt,r + i,t (2.15)
where YDt is a set of year dummies. Thus, we investigate if the instrumental variables
have an impact on immigration before the immigration wave with specification 2.12, and
if it has an effect on employment growth (2.13) or GDP growth, either across all sectors
in 2.14 or only in those sectors likely to benefit from refugee demand in 2.15. The tables
of results from these regressions are available upon request; the figures 2.6.1, 2.6.2 ,2.6.3,
2.6.4, 2.6.5 and 2.6.6 show these same coefficients in graphical form.
It becomes clear that prior to the refugee immigration wave of 2014-16, the distribu-
tion keys and empty apartments per person did not influence either immigration or the
economic development of a labor market region. Almost all of the coefficients before
2015 are insignificant.
When I do not normalize the empty apartment variable and immigration by the size
of the LMR, the picture for immigration looks more dramatic - figure 2.6.7 provides the
coefficients of a regression of the total number of immigrants on the total number of empty
apartments, interacted with a set of year dummies.
2.6.2 Discretization
Another way of testing the robustness of our results is to discretize the instrumental vari-
ables. Since we are using the time-federal state fixed effects in all our regressions (for
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Figure 2.6.1:
Figure 2.6.2:
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Figure 2.6.3:
Figure 2.6.4:
98
Figure 2.6.5:
reasons detailed in the background section), when we assign labor market regions to treat-
ment groups, we have to do so using their value of keyi and eappi relative to other regions
in the same state. This allows us to construct e.g. treatment and control groups which
have higher or lower values on the instrumental variable, relative to other labor market
regions in their state, or also to look at more quantiles of the distribution.
For the key difference instrument, I define all regions as treated which do not have a
negative key difference. A regression of immigration per person on this dummy (which
is one only in the treated regions and during the crisis years), shows a strongly positive
and significant impact of treatment on refugee immigration. For the empty apartments
variable, those regions are defined as treated which are above the within-state median of
empty apartments. Here again, the effect on refugee immigration is strongly significant.
Both regressions are shown in table 2.6.1, as well as a regression with both dummies.
They can serve as an alternative first stage specification.
In the second column, eappi is transformed into a categorical variable indicating the
quintiles. It is interacted with the same time dummy. The results do not quite show
the expected monotonicity; in fact, the first and second quintiles have indistinguishable
coefficients (the coefficient of the first quintile in dropped in the regression), and the
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Figure 2.6.6:
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Figure 2.6.7:
Table 2.6.1: First stage: distribution keys, empty apartments and immigration - discretiza-
tion
Immigrants per person
Crisis × distribution key dummy 0.16*** 0.14** 0.11**
(0.0) (0.1) (0.0)
Crisis × empty apmnts. dummy 0.062** 0.057** 0.046*
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region × time trends Yes
State × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
r2 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.78
N 2303 2303 2303 2303
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***.
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coefficients on the fourth and fifth quintiles are equally very similar. They are however
positive and (weakly) significant for the upper quintiles.
Table 2.6.2 shows the results of the full IV regression where the sample is split into
treatment and control groups. The first stage regression are the ones 2.6.1, otherwise the
regressions are the same as the ones specified in equation 2.4, that is, our main regressions
showing the effect of immigration on German employment. As you can see, the results
are very similar to the ones obtained from our main specifications, but less significant.
Table 2.6.2: Refugee immigration and employment change in percent, IV - discretized
treatment
(1) emp. change (2) emp. change (3) emp. change
Immigrants (per hundred in-
habitants)
1.4 10.6 7.8*
(2.8) (6.6) (4.3)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Region × time trends Yes Yes Yes
State × year FE Yes Yes Yes
N 2290 2290 2290
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***.
2.7 Conclusion and discussion
This paper shows that the refugee immigration wave of 2014-16 has so far had a signif-
icant positive impact on overall native employment. Especially employment in certain
sectors benefited from the demand generated by the refugees and by the associated gov-
ernment spending.
While this is a positive tentative conclusion with respect to the welfare of German na-
tionals, it is probably too early to make any final judgment about the eventual effects. In-
tegration of the new immigrants will require that many more of them do find employment.
A recent working paper (Evans and Fitzgerald, 2017) suggests that in the United States,
refugees integrated relatively well – young refugees show little difference in achievement
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with their native peers, while older ones found employment rather slowly but ultimately
at a high percentage. If this comes to pass, the patterns of substitution or complementarity
between native and immigrant labor may turn out to be very different. Better data will
also allow us to study the impact in more detail, and to pick up weaker effects with better
precision. The IAB will eventually make updated individual level panel data available,
including nationality, employer IDs, wages and employment status.
The consequences of the recent immigration wave in Germany can only be fully as-
sessed in a few years time. In the meantime, this paper highlights the short-term impact
of this important and controversial immigration.
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Appendix
2.A Network instrument
2.A.1 Size of pre-existing community (network), immigration, and
other economic trends
An alternative first-stage regression could have the following specification:
Ii,t = α Ni,t−1 + ΓXit + FEi + FEt,r + i,t (2.16)
where Ni,t−1 is the network size, he number of inhabitants of the same nationality as
the immigrants who already lived in region i at a previous point in time. As discussed, a
variation of this instrument has been used extensively in the literature. The network size
does indeed influence migration in our current application, before the refugee crisis as
well as during (see table 2.A.1).
However, we have to investigate if this instrument is correlated with other economic
outcomes before the immigration wave. Regressions of the form
Yi,t = αt (Ni,t−1 × YDt) + ΓXit + FEi + FEt,r + i,t (2.17)
where Yi,t are outcome variables such as GDP growth or the change in the unemploy-
ment rate, and YDt is a set of year dummies, reveal that regions with a large network
cannot be said to follow the same trends in economic development before the refugee im-
migration, as too many of the interaction coefficients are significantly different from zero
(see table 2.A.2).
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Table 2.A.1: Pre-existing networks and immigration
Immigration
Network size (3 origin countries) 0.644***
(0.200)
Network size × crisis years (2014-16) 0.222*
(0.116)
Region FE Yes
State × year FE Yes
r2 0.809
N 2313
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***.
Table 2.A.2: Correlations of immigrant networks with economic trends, pre-refugee crisis
Outcome variable Unemployment change GDP growth
Network size × 2009 0.161 -5.052*
(0.198) (2.823)
Network size × 2010 0.289 -8.809***
(0.180) (2.359)
Network size × 2011 0.242 -1.549
(0.157) (2.842)
Network size × 2012 0.00898 -2.196
(0.124) (2.201)
Network size × 2013 0.297** -2.480
(0.116) (1.568)
Network size × 2014 0.189** -1.318
(0.081) (1.268)
Region FE Yes Yes
State × year FE Yes Yes
r2 0.622 0.546
N 2031 2016
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***.
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2.A.2 Size of pre-existing community (network) and the composition
of the new immigrant population
Since I am not using individual-level data, I can not investigate selection effects in detail.
However, I do have data on the total population by gender and by type of residence permit.
This allows me to investigate if the network instrument or the instrument I use in this
paper - vacant apartments per person multiplied with the total number of immigrants to
Germany - is correlated with the share of immigrants who are female or with the share
who receive a particular residence permit.
There is no effect of either instrument on the share who are female, but the share who
receive the type of residence permit which is most secure and most tightly linked to the
asylum policy (permit for reasons of international law, humanitarian or political consider-
ations) is slightly higher where the network is stronger. Other possible residence permits
are permits for educational, work or family reasons as well as temporary suspensions of
deportation and others (which are rarely issued). This breakdown is difficult to use be-
cause different regions have different policies with respect to the permits they issue, even
when faced with the same cases of asylum seekers. 10
These effects can be seen from table 2.A.3. The effect is not strong and it does not
prove that selection is an important issue that would invalidate the network instrument,
given that the breakdown into different permits is probably quite unreliable. It could also
be that the network helps immigrants obtain the more secure type of permit, even when
the composition of immigrants in a region with a strong network would be exactly the
same as in other regions. This would however point to another problem: the network
would also help immigrants in other ways, such as finding employment, as this paper and
others argue. The native population would then be impacted by the network size during
an immigration wave, even if the primary effect of the network size on immigration were
absent. For all of these reasons I am using a different instrument in this paper, which the
partially managed nature of a refugee wave permits.
10I use the increase in total population rather than in population with a specific permit in my main
analysis, because of these problems and because I am interested in the effect of overall immigration.
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Table 2.A.3: Network size and the composition of the immigrant population
Outcome variable Female Female Ref. permit Ref. permit
Network size 0.001 0.04*
(0.001) (0.02)
Empty apmnts. 0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.003)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
r2 0.176 0.176 0.166 0.165
N 2243 2243 1990 1990
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***.
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Chapter 3
Reputational Incentives under
Heterogeneous Demand Fluctuations
with Milena Petrova
Using data from an online home services marketplace, we study reputational incentives in an
environment with heterogeneous seller demand fluctuations. Our strategy exploits the fact that
some professionals work in highly seasonal occupations, while others do not. We show that sellers
facing an upcoming demand downturn become less likely to receive a positive review, and we
argue that this is because they value their reputations less and exert lower effort. Robustness
checks rule out several other explanations for this phenomenon, e.g. reverse causality, selection of
sellers into jobs or differences in the cost of seller effort. Neither the economic literature nor the
platforms relying on reputation systems have sufficiently considered seller heterogeneity and the
optimal way to account for it in the information given to the buyer and in seller incentives.
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3.1 Introduction
Online platforms have been remarkably successful in generating activity in
many diverse markets such as the sale and re-sale of various new and used
goods (eBay, Amazon) and services such as short-term rentals of cars and
property (Uber, AirBnB). The apparent issues of anonymity and lack of
trust had made many doubtful of their viability in the beginning. The sell-
ers and buyers are typically separated geographically, and the interaction
is one-time only.
To a large extent, the success of online platforms can be credited to their
employment of reputation systems (or reputation mechanisms). These are
a set of rules by which buyer-seller interactions are reviewed publicly.
Even if individual buyers interact only once with the seller, the mecha-
nism establishes a dependence between current performance and future
demand. By subscribing to a marketplace with a public reputation system,
the seller agrees that the outcome of all interactions is made public, which
in turn informs the decision of future buyers. Knowing this, current buyers
are less hesitant to hire them.
Despite the ubiquity of reputation systems, the approach to their design
is often "one size fits all", with limited consideration of seller heterogene-
ity and the economic environment. The predominant way in which indi-
vidual reviews are aggregated and displayed is by taking a simple average,
thus making each review equally improtant. The biggest review systems
for restaurants - Tripadvisor, Yelp and GoogleMaps - use this simple ap-
proach. Amazon is one of the few online retailers that recognize the need
for a more fine-tuned reputation system: it gives higher visibility of re-
views received in the last 12 months, to prevent sellers from lowering
quality when they have already accumulated a large amount of positive
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reviews. In their working paper on the economics and the tech industry,
Athey and Luca (2018) note that platforms have to consider more care-
fully the way in which review information is made available to buyers, and
how this affects seller incentives. Economists have only recently started to
addressed optimality of reputation systems in specific economic environ-
ments, and how this can be achieved by review aggregation and display
(see Jin et al. (2018)).
In this paper, we provide evidence that when the economic environment
and actors are not homogeneous, a simple reputation system fails to in-
centivize a consistent effort level. We consider an environment in which
sellers are differently exposed to demand fluctuations. Because reputation
works by linking current and future demand, the value placed on a good
reputation by the seller is low when future transaction opportunities are
few. This lowers the incentive to exert effort, which in turn leads to a lower
probability that the buyer is satisfied by a project’s outcome. Consistent
with the hypothesis, our empirical results indicate that sellers who can ex-
pect a more significant demand downturn in the upcoming months are less
likely to receive a positive review.
We work with proprietary data from MaistorPlus, a Bulgarian online
marketplace for home services. MaistorPlus is similar to other well-known
platforms connecting clients, or buyers, and professionals, or sellers, such
as oDesk (IT and business professionals), TaskRabbit (for home owners
and low skilled labor), and Thumbtack (for a large variety of local ser-
vices). The seller’s account has information on his scope of expertise, and
it contains a public record of his activity on the platform: the number of
times he was hired and the corresponding average of the received reviews.1
1We refer to the individual interaction feedback as a review, while the cumulative of the reviews is the
seller’s reputation. In this sense, the review is an incremental change in reputation.
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This information is an important determinant of their chances to be con-
tacted and eventually hired by buyers. Our empirical analysis demonstrates
the positive returns to reputation, especially when demand is high.
The source of variation in our data comes from the seasonality of de-
mand for certain jobs, which is due to weather conditions permitting out-
door work. The majority of jobs are posted between July and November,
which we call the high demand season. The sellers themselves special-
ize in different services, meaning that they are heterogeneously exposed to
the demand seasonality. For example, someone specializing in plumbing
services would see a more steady flow of demand compared to someone
specializing in roof repairs, which mostly take place in the summer and
autumn. As a result, the seasonal fluctuation of demand, which translates
to a reputational incentive to exert effort, varies at the level of the individ-
ual seller. The analysis focuses on the seller’ behavior at the end of the
high demand season, when the discounted sum of work opportunities in
the immediate future is the lowest.
Our measure of demand heterogeneity is seller demand Smoothness: the
average monthly demand in the low period relative to the average monthly
demand in the high period. A smoothness measure closer to one implies
lower exposure to seasonality (most sellers are affected at least to some
extent). We construct this variable using overall demand in the categories
in which the seller is active, rather than the sellers’ individual activity.
Smoothness therefore measures exogenous demand conditions rather than
the sellers’ endogenous choices, so that our results are not confounded
by reverse causality (after a positive review, the sellers may increase their
activity).
The end of the high demand season is associated with a lower likelihood
114
of a positive review across all sellers. This may be due to reasons other
than lower effort, as the end of the high demand season is potentially as-
sociated with disruption in material supplies, bad weather or last-minute
projects that are harder to perform well. By interacting seller-specific de-
mand Smoothness and the time variable High season end, we are sure to
find an effect which is driven by heterogeneous demand conditions at the
level of the individual seller. We find that the sellers whose demand drops
substantially in the upcoming low demand season are less likely to receive
a positive review. The average seller in our sample has a 4 percent lower
probability of a positive review in the last months of the high season. For
sellers with low demand smoothness at the 10th percentile of the distribu-
tion, we see a drop of 16 percent, while sellers at the 90th percentile see
an increase of 18 percent in the probability of a positive review. 2
Our hypothesis assumes that the channel through which future demand
affects the outcome is seller effort, via the value of reputation. Since we use
fixed effects on the level of the individual seller, we can rule out that our
results are driven by selection of professionals. We perform a number of
robustness checks to rule out alternative explanations. In the first such test,
we include time-varying dummies for categories of work that are highly
seasonal. This addresses the concern that these categories of work may be
less likely to receive positive reviews at the end of the season, and be at the
same more sought out by low smoothness professionals. We also rule out
the possibility that sellers who drop out of the platform at the end of the
high season drive our results. Additionally, we propose two specifications
that test indirectly whether the cost of effort, as a function of demand or of
the size of the seller, confounds the results.
2The results in the reverse direction are weekly significant in some specifications: the end of the low
demand season is associated with a higher likelihood of a positive review, but less so for sellers with more
seasonal demand.
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Given the current reputation mechanism, our results can be used to in-
form buyers better about seller incentives. Consider roof repairs, a highly
seasonal job due to weather conditions. Towards the end of the high de-
mand season, a homeowner would be better off with a seller specializing in
plumbing and fixing roofs on the side (high Smoothness), rather than with
the roof specialist (low Smoothness), all else equal. Equally, a homeowner
looking for a roof specialist early in the season should not be as concerned
by a negative review that was received in November as much as by one
received in June. The results suggest that design the system itself may
be optimized in a way that provides more consistent incentives for seller
effort. For example, the reputation system can aggregate seller reviews
through a weighted average that puts higher weights on reviews received
under circumstances similar to the ones facing the particular seller.
Our work is related to a recent literature which uses data from online
marketplaces to test formal reputation models, to study reputation dynam-
ics, and to evaluate the effectiveness of reputation systems. The surveys of
Bajari and Hortacsu (2004), Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008), Cabral (2012)
and most recently Tadelis (2016) document this body of work. A substan-
tial number of papers in the literature attempt to test whether the source of
informational asymmetry in the market is due to moral hazard or adverse
selection. For example, Cabral and Hortacsu (2010) examine the dynam-
ics of seller reputation on eBay and find strong evidence for moral hazard:
the first negative feedback received lowers the returns to reputation once
and for all, and sellers react by lowering their effort and eventually exit-
ing. However, the authors cannot rule out an underlying moral hazard plus
adverse selection model. While the objective of our paper is not to rule
out adverse selection, it is seller effort, rather than seller type, which is
affected by the demand fluctuation. In the robustness checks, we rule out
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two alternative explanations for the effect we find that are based on seller
type (seller size and exiting sellers).
The effectiveness of reputation systems has raised considerable research
interest, with the majority of work focusing on the ability of reputation
mechanisms to elicit truthful reviews. For example, Fradkin et al. (2017)
investigate the informativeness of reviews on a hospitality marketplace,
AirBnB, where review reciprocity causes significant bias. Horton and
Golden (2015) also document reputation inflation, on oDesk, a service
marketplace. Only recently have economists considered more explicitly
how seller reviews should be aggregated, with the objective of providing
future buyers with the most up to date information and sellers with the
right incentives. The work of Jin et al. (2018) considers the optimal design
of a reputation system in an environment with changing service quality.
Because quality is exogenous, the effect of the reputation mechanism de-
sign on seller incentives is not a part of their analysis. We are not aware of
other empirical work studying the heterogeneity of reputational incentives
across sellers.
Although their work concerns the credit rating industry, Bar-Isaac and
Shapiro (2013) are closer to the topic of our work as they investigate how
the exogenous variation of the business cycle, a common demand trend,
drives reputational incentives for Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). The
value of reputation is shown to depend on the economic fundamentals
varying over the business cycle. Ratings accuracy is counter-cyclical as
effort is lower during periods of high economic activity, which is consis-
tent with our findings that the probability of a positive review is influenced
by demand fluctuations.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on our
117
data source, the MaistorPlus marketplace, including information on the
categories of jobs available and their seasonal variation, the sellers and the
reputation mechanism. Section 3 presents the empirical implementation,
as well as the results and robustness checks. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 MaistorPlus and data generation
We work with company data form the MaistorPlus marketplace, founded in
Sofia, Bulgaria in 2012, and our sample covers the period between January
2013 and July 2015.3 The marketplace connects buyers to subscribing
home service sellers and is financed by sellers’ subscription fees and by
advertisements.
3.2.1 Job activity and reviews
Demand on the marketplace is generated by buyers who sign up freely and
post what we call jobs: home repair projects for which they want to hire
a service provider. We observe 4,167 jobs, as well as data at the job-seller
level of interaction. The total value of all jobs in our sample is 12.6 million
Euros.
The buyer provides a description of the job, specifies the job category
(such as carpentry, roof repairs, construction, etc), an estimated budget,
and a start date. All sellers active in that job category are potentially avail-
able and notified of the job; those who are actually available can message
the buyer. The buyer is free to inspect the seller profiles and their reputa-
tion when he decides who to contact or hire. In the data, the buyers contact
3The website of the market place is: http://maistorplus.com/
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1.3 sellers on average, and hire someone for 27% of posted jobs (see Table
3.2.1).
Table 3.2.1: Job activity on MaistorPlus
Data Observations Per job
Distinct jobs 4,167 -
- potentially available sellers 333,639 80.0
- available sellers 22,379 5.37
- contacted sellers 5,354 1.28
- hired sellers 1,126 0.27
- positive reviews (total and per hire) 749 0.66
- total value (Euro) 12,650,600 2,785
Only buyers who have hired a seller through the marketplace are allowed
to post a review, which can be positive, negative, or neutral, or missing
(1/0/-1/.). As it is customary in the empirical reputations literature, we
separate the reviews into positive and non-positive reviews.4 Out of 1,126
jobs where someone was hired in our sample, we observe that the buyer
left a positive review in 749 cases.5
For buyer reviews to carry information, it is necessary that the good or
service in question can be competently evaluated by the buyer. Services
performed by expert professionals, such as home repairs, can have aspects
of credence goods, as the buyer only observes whether the immediate prob-
lem is fixed, but not the quality of the work or whether problems were
over-diagnosed. Seller professionalism, as well as explanations of how the
problem arose and how to present future problems, are therefore highly
4Consistent with the previous literature (e.g. Nosko and Tadelis (2015) and Dellarocas and Wood
(2008)), we view no feedback and neutral feedback as a non-positive review.
5The buyers can also post a textual review of the interaction. However, we do not work with this metric
because it is highly collinear with the point review.
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valued by the buyers and the predominant themes of the textual part of the
reviews. Providing this observable aspect of the service is still costly and
affected by fluctuations in the value of reputation.
3.2.2 Service sellers
There is a total of 864 active sellers in our sample, of whom 251 were hired
at least once. They subscribe to one of three fixed-term plans, ordered by
their annual cost: Start (100 Euro), Pro (150 Euro) and Pro+ (250 Euro).
The more costly the plan, the more options the sellers have for the number
of categories in which they are active (3/4/6 categories). The sellers can
change these at any time and at no cost, potentially adjusting their activ-
ity to seasonal demand fluctuations. While the buyers can infer, to some
extent, the seller size and scope of activity by observing the current active
categories, they do not observe history of category changes, and therefore
seller’s demand smoothness.
Table 3.2.2 presents summary statistics on the experience of the sellers
present in the main analysis: the sellers who were hired at least once in
the duration of our sample. The average seller is hired 4.5 times and has
3 positive reviews, both with high standard deviation. The average time
between the last two messages of interest is about 9 days, but some sell-
ers appear to have not been available much longer. The average activity
span (time between the first and last message observed in the data) is 19
months out of 38 months in the data. Periods of high inactivity are likely
for sellers who work in seasonal job categories, and among those who use
the marketplace relatively rarely because they have sufficient job referrals
from outside of the marketplace.
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Table 3.2.2: The experience of the MaistorPlus sellers on the marketplace.
At latest observed time period: Mean St. dev Min Max
- activity span on marketplace (months) 19.19 8.56 0 30
- time between last two messages (days) 8.65 39.5 0 362
- total times hired 4.48 7.02 1 49
- total positive reviews 2.98 5.17 0 38
3.2.3 Seasonality and reputation
Demand in the home services sector is highly seasonal because some types
of services, for example outdoor work, can only be done during the months
when the weather permits. There are also services that are demanded right
before the start of fall and winter, such as services related to heating and
insulation. Examples of demand seasonality in the different job categories
can be found in Figure 1.
To establish the duration of the high demand season, we look at the num-
ber of jobs posted on the platform each month during the period 2013-
2015, N. jobs. Table 3.2.3 has the results from two regressions that help
us do that. In the first regression S 1, we use indicators for the individual
months. Months July through November experience a significantly higher
level of demand compared to other months. We define a seasonal variable
High season equal to 1 for months months July-November and use that in
the second regression S 2. The explanatory power of S 2 is still very high,
and in fact the adjusted R2 is higher compared to S 1.
Implicit in our hypothesis that an upcoming, temporary demand down-
turn lowers effort are the assumptions that reputation is more valuable
when demand is high, and that professionals discount demand in the more
distant future strongly enough. In the appendix 3.A, we present a small
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Figure 3.2.1: Number of jobs posted by both in different categories, year 2014
122
Table 3.2.3: Monthly demand on the market-
place and the High season dummy.
Dependent variable N. jobs N. jobs
Specification (S1) (S2)
Independent variables
February -0.061
(0.311)
March 0.236
(0.316)
April 0.277
(0.297)
May 0.319
(0.403)
June 0.410
(0.426)
July 0.988***
(0.314)
August 1.016***
(0.338)
September 0.945***
(0.317)
October 0.828**
(0.305)
November 0.801**
(0.323)
December 0.250
(0.322)
High season 0.711***
(0.090)
Constant 4.410*** 4.615***
(0.299) (0.094)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
R2 0.88 0.85
R2 Adjusted 0.81 0.83
N. observations 36 36
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***.
Robust standard errors.
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theoretical model making these assumptions in a more formal way, and we
argue for their validity here.
Ex-ante, it is not obvious whether reputation is more valuable during
high or low demand periods. On the one hand, the value of reputation could
be higher in the high demand period because there are more buyers with
a high willingness to pay for a seller with a high reputation. On the other
hand, reputation could be more valuable in the low demand season when
there are fewer jobs and more intense competition between the sellers.
We resolve this question by going to the data. We construct a panel at
the professional-date level and a variable measuring the unconditional re-
turns to reputation as the number of times a seller was contacted by buyers
in a given month, Monthly contacts.6 The variables of interest in specifi-
cation C1 are our measure of reputation, Percent positive reviews, lagged
one month, and the High season indicator. Their interaction is included
in specification C2. Other control variables include the seller’s activity on
the platform during that time (how many jobs he was invited to, how many
times he was available), and date and seller fixed effects. The estimates
are presented in Table 3.2.4. The benefits of a good reputation are indeed
positive: the number of monthly contacts increases with Percent positive
reviews. The results of the second regression support the claim that repu-
tation is more valuable when demand is high as the coefficient on the in-
teraction between Percent positive reviews and High season is positive and
significant. If Percent positive reviews increases by 20 percentage points,
Monthly contacts in the High demand period increase by 1.3 percent.
Table 3.2.2, presenting summary statistics on the usage and experience
6The hiring decision is joint and depends on other potential projects that the seller may be considering.
Therefore, we prefer to use as dependent variable the number of times the buyers have expressed preference
for hiring the seller, i.e. Monthly contacts.
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Table 3.2.4: Returns to reputation and the High season.
Dependent variable Monthly contacts Monthly contacts
Specification (C1) (C2)
Independent variables
Percent positive reviews 0.038* 0.016
(0.020) (0.021)
High season 0.115*** 0.107***
(0.018) (0.018)
High season*Percent positive reviews 0.065***
(0.014)
Messages of availability 0.422*** 0.422***
(0.007) (0.007)
Constant -0.071 -0.069
(0.051) (0.051)
Fixed effects
Date Yes Yes
Seller Yes Yes
R2 0.77 0.77
N. observations 16,912 16,912
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Robust standard errors. The continuous
dependent variables and regressors (except Percent positive reviews) are transformed by taking
their natural logarithm, and their coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. The coefficient on
Percent positive reviews is a semi-elasticity.
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of professionals on MaistorPlus, shows why it is credible that the tem-
porary seasonality can affect a professional’s valuation of their reputation
to a measurable degree. The platform is young, and has low overall de-
mand. The average professional is active on the platform for a year and
eight months, and has been hired 4.5 times. This shows that, clearly, Mais-
torPlus is not the main source of jobs for the professionals, and they may
be quite uncertain about platform activity – both their own and demand –
even a few months into the future. It is this uncertainty about platform use,
rather than time discounting of future income, that makes a strong discount
factor plausible.
3.3 Econometric analysis
Our econometric analysis is based on the difference in differences method-
ology. The results indicate that indeed sellers who experience a drop in
demand are less likely to receive a positive review towards the end of the
high season. We also see a weekly significant result in the reverse di-
rection: sellers who experience an increase in demand are more likely to
receive a positive review towards the end of the low demand season. We
perform a number of robustness checks that corroborate this conclusion.
3.3.1 Demand smoothness
Central to empirical analysis is the variable measuring how the seller’s het-
erogeneous demand fluctuates, Smoothnessi. Let k denote the individual
job categories and i denote the sellers. The data allows us to observe the set
{Ki} of categories that seller i is available in. For example, Construction is
one such category for seller i if the seller has expressed availability to a job
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in that category. Let Demandk,S eason denote the number of unique jobs in
category k during the respective season.7 As the platform is still growing
during the period of observation, we group two Low and two High seasons
to improve the representativeness of the demand pattern. Assuming that
demand grows multiplicatively, our definition of Smoothnessi is not dis-
torted by this. For the demand in the High season, we use the jobs posted
on the marketplace during July 2014-Nov 2014 and July 2015-Nov 2015.
For demand during the Low season, we use jobs during Dec 2013-June
2014 and Dec 2014 - June 2015.
For the seller i, the monthly demand during any given season, Demandi,S eason,
is the sum of demand over his active categories {Ki} in that season, Demandk,S eason,
divided by the duration of the season.8 The seller’s demand Smoothnessi
is the ratio of of demand in the low season to demand in the high season.
Constructed this way, the demand measure is exogenous to the seller’s ac-
tual activity and reputation. In other words, Smoothnessi is defined as:
Smoothnessi =
Demandi,Low
Demandi,High
=
1
5
∑
k∈Ki Demandk,Low
1
7
∑
k∈Ki Demandk,High
A demand Smoothnessi value of 1 would indicate no fluctuation: seller i
faces the same demand conditions during the Lowseasont and the Highseasont.
The lower is the value of Smoothnessi, the more the seller is exposed to the
seasonality of demand. Most sellers experience a drop in demand during
the low season, and the average value of smoothness is 0.59. A few sellers
7Our data rangers from January 2013 to December 2015 but there was a significant change in the mar-
ketplace rules in July 2015. The change affects the activity of the sellers, hence we cannot use data after it
for the main analysis. However, it does not affect demand incidence.
8The low and high demand seasons have different duration, 5 and 7 months respectively. Dividing the
total demand by the season length is necessary to avoid a mechanical difference due to the different length
of the seasons.
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Figure 3.3.1: Histogram of Smoothnessi for all sellers in the sample.
experience reverse seasonality with Smoothnessi maximum of 1.59. Fig-
ure 2 contains the histogram of Smoothnessi. The distribution is can be
described as relatively bell-shaped with a longer tail on the right.
3.3.2 Main specification and results
We test the hypothesis that seller demand heterogeneity affects seller in-
centives to exert effort, which in turn affects the probability that a job is
done well and the seller receiving a positive review. This effect should
be especially strong at the end of the high demand season, when the dis-
counted sum of future demand is the lowest.
To this end, we work with a sample of completed jobs, indexed by the
hired seller i, the date defined as month-year t, and the job characteristics k.
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The outcome variable of interest is the probability that the seller i receives
a positive review for job k in period t, Pr(Positive review)ikt. The variable
High season endt which indicates if the job was posted in the two months
of the high demand season (October and November) and it is the com-
mon trend among all sellers. We interact it with seller Smoothnessi to test
whether sellers heterogeneous demand fluctuation affect the probability of
Pr(Positive review)ikt.
Specification (1) is:
Pr(Positive review)ikt = β1High season endt + β2Smoothnessi ∗ High season endt
+ γXit + FEi + FEk + FEt + ikt
The coefficient of interest is β2. If it is positive, sellers with lower de-
mand fluctuations (a higher Smoothnessi) are more likely to receive a pos-
itive review at the end of the high season. Or, the more the seller is exposed
to seasonal demand fluctuations, the less likely he is to receive a positive
review at the end of the high season.
As controls, we include covariates measuring seller experience and a
number of fixed effects. The variable Xit is the Percent positive reviews.
We also include fixed effects for each seller i, for the job category, budget
and start date of the job k, and for the time period t. Since Smoothnessi is
constant over the sellers, it is absorbed by the seller fixed effects.
In specification (2), we allow for the complementary effect by including
Low season endt dummy equal to 1 for the months May and June and
its interaction with Smoothnessi. We expect coefficient β4 to be negative,
suggesting sellers who do not experience significant demand fluctuations
are is less likely to make exceptional effort to improve their reputation
before the beginning of the high season.
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Specification (2) is:
Pr(Positive review)ikt = β1High season endt + β2Smoothnessi ∗ High season endt
+ β3Low season endt + β4Smoothnessi ∗ Low season endt
+ γXit + FEi + FEk + FEt + ikt
We employ a linear probability model to make the interpretation of the
estimated effects easier. Our estimates of (1) and (2) can be found in Table
3.3.1.9 We find that the High season endt is associated with a general drop
in the probability of a positive review. This effect is countered by demand
Smoothnessi, as the estimated coefficient on the interaction is positive. For
the median seller with Smoothnessi = 0.57, the probability of receiving a
positive review at the end of the high season is 4 percent lower: −0.99 +
0.57×1.66 = −0.04. sellers at the 10th percentile see a drop of 16 percent,
while those at the 90th percentile actually see an increase of 18 percent in
the probability of positive review at the end of the high season.
The results of specification (2) are in line with specification (1), but
the additional variables are not significant. It is possible that this is be-
cause of the small sample size. The Low season endt is associated with
a higher likelihood of a positive review, and sellers with higher demand
Smoothnessi are less likely to receive a positive review at the end of the
low demand season.
Conditional on the seller being hired, we find that the variable Percent
positive reviews is associated negatively with the probability of receiving
another positive review. A potential explanation is that sellers are strategic
in building and using up their reputation. Strategic reputation building is
9The results of probit and logit specifications are consistent and available upon request.
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Table 3.3.1: Linear probability model for receiving a positive review.
Dependent variable Positive review Positive review
Specification (1) (2)
Independent variables
High season end -0.986** -0.919**
(0.439) (0.446)
Smoothness*High season end 1.659** 1.532**
(0.653) (0.666)
Low season end 1.057
(0.860)
Smoothness*Low season end -2.319
(1.448)
Percent positive reviews -0.272*** -0.274***
(0.065) (0.064)
Constant 1.381*** 1.396***
(0.265) (0.264)
Fixed effects
Job category, budget, start Yes, Yes, Yes Yes, Yes, Yes
Date Yes Yes
Seller Yes Yes
R2 0.41 0.41
N. observations 1,126 1,126
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Robust standard errors.
The continuous regressors (except Percent positive reviews) are transformed by
taking their natural logarithm, and their coefficients can be interpreted as elastici-
ties. The coefficient on Percent positive reviews is a semi-elasticity.
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indirect evidence of moral hazard, and moral hazard as predominant source
of asymmetric information has been recorded in online environments such
as eBay by Klein et al. (2016).
3.3.3 Robustness checks
We consider the robustness of our results to alternative channels of causal-
ity: selection between sellers and jobs, a pure end-game effect, and cost of
effort.
Selection between sellers and jobs
As already mentioned in the MaistorPlus and data generaton section,
the buyers do not observe the heterogeneous sellerl demand fluctuations,
hence the opportunities for selection on the part of the buyers is limited.
However, it is possible that sellers of different Smoothnessi self-select into
different jobs k, at different times t, and this interferes with our results.
Consider the indicator S easonal categoryk equal to 1 for jobs with high
demand incidence in June to November.10 It may be that jobs in seasonal
categories are more difficult to complete successfully. It is also possible
that their successful completion is affected by the time period, for exam-
ple: seasonal jobs may suffer from worsening weather conditions at the
end of the high demand season. In addition, sellers in more seasonal lines
of work (and therefore lower demand Smoothnessi) may be more likely
to take on seasonal jobs, especially at the end of the high demand sea-
son. These effects present an alternative relationship between the proba-
bility of a positive review and the explanatory variables of interest: job
10To classify the jobs, we regress monthly job incidence on the Highseasont dummy. These regression
are available upon request.
132
seasonality affects the effort level needed for a positive review, and low
demand Smoothnessi sellers select into seasonal jobs towards the end of
the high demand season. To test this, we augment (1) by interacting the
High season endt and Smoothnessi variables individually and jointly with
the S easonal categoryi dummy.11 Our first robustness specification (R1)
is:
Pr(Positive review)ikt = β1High season endt + β2S easonal categoryk
+ β3Smoothnessi ∗ High season endt
+ β4S easonal categoryk ∗ Smoothnessi
+ β5S easonal categoryk ∗ Smoothnessi ∗ High season endt
+ γXit + FEi + FEk + FEt + ikt
The results of (R1) can be found in Table 3.3.2. Jobs in seasonal cate-
gories are not more or less likely to get a positive review, neither in gen-
eral nor only at the end of the season. The probability of a positive re-
view for a seasonal job is also not affected by the demand Smoothnessi of
the hired seller, neither overall nor at the end of the high demand season.
The main effects of interest - the Highseasonendt and its interaction with
Smoothnessi - remain significant and of similar higher magnitude.
Leaving the platform
In the period for which we have data, the platform is relatively young and
some sellers in our sample become inactive after a while. For these sellers,
the incentive to exert effort in the last months of their subscription is even
11Individual category fixed effects are no longer included because of collinearity with the Seasonal cate-
gory dummy.
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Table 3.3.2: Robustness check with seasonal category fixed effect and in-
teractions.
Dependent variable Positive review Positive review
Specification (1) (R1)
Independent variables
High season end -0.992** -1.507**
(0.413) (0.480)
Seasonal category -0.037
(1.111)
Smoothness*High season end 1.626** 2.333***
(0.683) (0.421)
Seasonal category*High season end 0.859
(1.033)
Seasonal category*Smoothness -0.058
(1.885)
Seasonal category*Smoothness*High season end -1.310
(1.646)
Percent positive reviews -0.220*** -0.211***
(0.063) (0.061)
Total times hired -0.030 -0.030
(0.037) (0.036)
Constant 1.360*** 0.942
(0.249) (4.857)
Fixed effects
Job category, budget, start Yes, Yes, Yes No, Yes, Yes
Date Yes Yes
Seller Yes Yes
R2 0.41 0.39
N. observations 1,126 1,126
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Robust standard errors. The
continuous regressors (except Percent positive reviews) are transformed by taking their
natural logarithm, and their coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. The coefficient
on Percent positive reviews is a semi-elasticity.
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lower, as they may be "cashing in" their reputation. If the end of their use
of the platform coincides with the end of the high demand period, it may
be that this is partially driving our results.
We restrict our sample to only those sellers who are still active on the
platform in 2015 and 2016, which brings down our observations to 867
from 1,126. The results from estimating our model on the restricted sam-
ple, (R2), are presented in Table 3.3.3; all coefficients on the variables of
interest are very similar to those in our main specification. This is not
surprising, since the mean of demand Smoothnessi of the two groups, the
sellers who continue to be active and those who drop out, is not statistically
different.
Cost of effort
A potential confounding factor in our results is the cost of effort, which
may also change when demand is high, and differentially so for for sellers
with different demand smoothness. With no information on seller costs, we
are unable investigate this directly. Instead, we propose two regressions
providing indirect evidence that the cost of effort is the driving factor of
our results.
Firstly, we conjecture that the cost of effort fluctuates with current de-
mand, and not with the discounted sum of demand in future periods. In
(R3), we use the full set of bi-monthly indicators on their own and inter-
acted with the Smoothness variable.
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Table 3.3.3: Robustness check with sample restricted to
sellers still active in 2015 and 2016.
Dependent variable Positive review Positive review
Specification (1) (R2)
Independent variables
High season end -0.992** -1.035***
(0.413) (0.396)
Smoothness*High season end 1.626** 1.685***
(0.681) (0.649)
Percent positive reviews -0.220*** -0.230***
(0.062) (0.067)
Total times hired -0.029 -0.024
(0.037) (0.039)
Constant 1.360*** 1.265***
(0.249) (0.245)
Fixed effects
Job category, budget, start Yes, Yes, Yes Yes, Yes, Yes
Time (year) Yes Yes
seller Yes Yes
R2 0.37 0.31
N. observations 1,126 867
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Robust
standard errors. The continuous regressors (except Percent positive
reviews) are transformed by taking their natural logarithm, and their
coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. The coefficient on Per-
cent positive reviews is a semi-elasticity.
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Pr(Positive review)ikt =
T=6∑
t=2
β jBimonthly dummyt
+
T=6∑
t=2
α jSmoothnessi ∗ Bimonthly dummyt
+ γXit + FEi + FEk + FEt + ikt
The estimation results of (R3) indicate no evidence to support a cost
of effort based on the level of current demand. Indeed, the probability
of positive review is significantly lower only in October and November.
Furthermore, we see no differential effect for sellers of different demand
Smoothnessi.
Another way to look at the issue of fluctuating costs is to consider the
relationship between the size of the seller’s operations and Smoothnessi.
If sellers with lower Smoothnessi are also smaller, they may be relatively
more overstretched during the high demand season. In this sense, our esti-
mations would be suffering from omitted variable bias, where Smoothnessi
picks up the effect of the omitted variable measuring seller cost of effort.
To remedy this, we use the mean budget size for all jobs for which the seller
was available, Average budgeti, as a metric for seller size, and interact it
with the High season endt dummy.
Pr(Positive review)ikt = β1High season endt + β2S easonal categoryk
+ β3Smoothnessi ∗ High season endt
+ β4Average budgeti ∗ High season endt
+ γXit + FEi + FEk + FEt + ikt
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Table 3.3.4: Robustness check with bimonthly fixed ef-
fects.
Dependent variable Positive review Positive review
Specification (1) (R3)
Independent variables
High season end -0.992**
(0.413)
Smoothness*High season end 1.162**
(0.486)
Feb& March 1.000
(1.230)
Apr&May 0.888
(1.222)
Jul& Jun -1.369
(1.062)
Aug& Sep -1.750
(1.192)
Oct& Nov -2.035*
(1.050)
Feb& March*Smoothness -1.701
(2.103)
Apr& May*Smoothness -1.531
(2.096)
Jun& Jul*Smoothness 2.403
(1.805)
Aug& Sep*Smoothness 2.782
(2.026)
Oct& Nov*Smoothness 3.316*
(1.763)
Fixed effects
Job category, budget, start Yes, Yes, Yes Yes, Yes, Yes
Date Yes Yes
Seller Yes Yes
R2 0.37 0.39
N. observations 1,126 1,126
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Robust
standard errors. Constant, Percent positive reviews and Total times
hired omitted from table for brevity.
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Table 3.3.5: Robustness check with measures of seller size.
Dependent variable Positive review Positive review
Specification (1) (R4)
Independent variables
High season end -0.992** -1.363
(0.415) (1.078)
Smoothness*High season end 1.626** 1.814**
(0.683) (0.705)
Percent positive reviews -0.220*** -0.222***
(0.063) (0.063)
Total times hired -0.029 -0.030
(0.037) (0.037)
Average budget*High season end 0.033
(0.090)
Constant 1.360*** 0.349
(0.249) (0.820)
Fixed effects
Job category, budget, start Yes, Yes, Yes Yes, Yes, Yes
Date Yes Yes
Seller Yes Yes
R2 0.37 0.37
N. observations 1,126 1,126
Significant at: p < 0.1: *; p < 0.05: **; p < 0.01: ***. Robust stan-
dard errors. The continuous regressors (except Percent positive reviews,
total offers and average budget) are transformed by taking their natural
logarithm, and their coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. The
coefficient on Percent positive reviews is a semi-elasticity.
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The results of (R4) are presented in Table 3.3.5. Average budgeti inter-
acted with High season endt is not statistically significant, which suggests
that our results are not suffering from bias due to omitting seller cost of
effort that is also correlated with seller demand heterogeneity.
3.4 Conclusion and outlook
Reputation systems are essential for online economic activity because they
provide buyers with information and sellers with incentives. However, the
approach to designing such system is uniform and without much consid-
eration for the economic environment and seller incentive heterogeneity.
The economic literature has only recently started to consider the question
of optimal aggregation and display of review information, and the effect
that would have on seller behavior. Our work aims to inform this ques-
tion by documenting how heterogeneous seller demand fluctuations lead
to inconsistent effort provision on an online services marketplace.
Apart from the general contribution of our results, there are specific im-
plications for reputation mechanism design in environments with hetero-
geneous demand fluctuations. For example, firms in the tourism indus-
try (restaurants, hotels, etc) are similarly susceptible to heterogeneous and
fluctuating demand and therefore incentives. The majority of buyers in
these markets, who are tourists, rely exclusively on online reputation when
making choices. Buyers choosing between hotels in tourist and residen-
tial areas may not be fully aware of the different demand conditions, and
therefore incentives, that these establishments face. Making certain re-
views more prominent, either by increasing their weight or visibility, can
provide buyers with more useful information and sellers with more consis-
tent incentives.
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Appendix
3.A Theoretical framework
In this section, we present a general principal-agent model of moral hazard
with imperfectly observed, costly effort and fluctuating demand. Like in
Holmström (1999), payment is not contingent on performance, and the
agent is incentivized to exert effort by career concerns. Agents do not have
different types, however; the project’s success, which is what the principal
observes, is an increasing, stochastic function of the agent’s costly effort.
The principal makes the project’s success public information by posting
a review, thus influencing the agent’s reputation and the demand for his
services in future periods.
The new element is the seasonal demand fluctuation, which affects the
agent’s incentive to exert effort. When the seller faces high demand in the
next period, the return to a good reputation is also high. The model is
in partial equilibrium in the sense that we only consider the actions of an
individual seller in the face of given demand, rather than the supply and
demand of services in the market, taking into account the optimal behavior
of all market players.
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3.A.1 Demand smoothness and reputation
Let the subscript i identify the seller and the subscript t the period of ob-
servation. Let dit be the monthly and Dit be the discounted sum of monthly
demand of seller i at time t, and δ be the common discount factor. Then,
Dit is defined as:
Dit ≡
∞∑
m=1
δmdi,t+m,
The value to seller i at time t of subscribing to the marketplace is denoted
as Vit. It is a function f of the total discounted demand Dit, the seller’s
reputation rit, and unobserved factors ξi:
Vit = f (Dit, rit, ξi) ,
We assume that the function f is increasing in the first two arguments:
∂Vit
∂Dit
=
∂ f (Dit, rit, ξi)
∂Dit
≥ 0
∂Vit
∂rit
=
∂ f (Dit, rit, ξi)
∂rit
≥ 0
and that their cross-derivative is also positive:
∂2Vit
∂Dit∂rit
=
∂2 f (Dit, rit, ξi)
∂Dit∂rit
≥ 0.
Our first two assumptions are straightforward: the value of subscribing to
the marketplace increases with demand, since demand increases the num-
ber of jobs available, and in reputation, since a higher reputation increases
the probability to be hired for a given job.
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The cross-derivative tells us that a decrease in reputation is less harmful
when the discounted sum of future demand is low. Alternatively, an in-
crease in reputation would be more valuable when future demand is high.
This condition would be satisfied e.g. if in the function f , all future dis-
counted demand flows would simply be linearly multiplied by a probability
of being hired p(rit), where ∂p(rit)/∂rit ≥ 0. The assumption of a positive
cross-derivative, indicating higher returns to a high reputation when de-
mand is high, is supported by our empirical analysis in Table 3.2.4.
For a seller who does not face any seasonality, the value of Dit is stable.
However, for a seller who faces seasonally fluctuating demand, this value
reaches a minimum during the last month of the high demand season. More
specifically, assume demand during the Low season is smaller by a factor
of S i ∈ (0, 1), the demand Smoothness variable. This means that dit is
simply d in the High season and S i × d in the Low season . Then DNovit in
November is smaller than Dit, the value for future demand averaged over
all other months, by
Dit − DNovit =
∞∑
s=0
6∑
m=1
d
[
δ12s+m
(
1 − S i
2
)
+ δ12s+m+6
(
S i − 1
2
)]
This difference is positive for the typical S i ∈ (0, 1), and it decreases
in S i. It relies on a strong enough month-to-month discount factor δ to be
meaningful. Similarly, let V it be the average value of the marketplace to the
seller, and VNovit be the value at November. Thus, the value of subscribing
is least sensitive to a change in reputation during the month of November:
∂V it
∂rit
>
∂VNovit
∂rit
> 0
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Define the marginal change in reputation due to a negative (non-positive)
review by r−. The associated loss in value, xit, suffered by the seller is:
xit ≡ ∂Vit
∂rit
× r−.
xit captures the penalty that a seller suffers from a negative review, and
serves to discipline moral hazard.12 Defining x¯it as the average disutility
of a negative review, and xNovit as the disutility suffered in November, we
know:
x¯it > xNovit .
This difference decreases in S i, the seller-specific demand Smoothesss:
∂(x¯it − xNovit )
∂S i
< 0.
Thus, the model as specified predicts that the penalty of a negative (non-
positive) review is lowest at the end of the high demand season, and de-
creases in the smoothness of seller demand.
3.A.2 Effort and reputation
Consider buyer j who hires seller i to complete a project, whose outcome
can be either a "success" or not. The seller’s effort ei, with cost c(ei), de-
termines the probability of success pi(ei). The buyer observes whether it is
a success but does not observe the effort level. The buyer pays the seller
p j irrespective of the project outcome. If the project is not a success, the
12For simplicity we assume that the reputation does not change when a project is completed successfully.
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buyer leaves a negative (non-positive) review, which damages the reputa-
tion of the seller and lowers his value of subscribing to the platform by
xit.
Let vi j be the value of project j to seller i, defined as:
vi j = p j − c(ei) − (1 − pi(ei))xit.
The seller maximizes vi j by setting the optimal effort level ei. The first
order condition is:
c′(ei) = pi′(ei)xit.
Both the cost of effort and the probability of success increase in the level
of effort: ∂c(ei)
∂ei
> 0 and ∂pi(ei)
∂ei
> 0. This establishes the following:
∂ei
∂xit
> 0.
In the data, we are able to observe the determinants of xit: the demand
smoothness of individual sellers Smoothnessi and the timing of the job
post t in the demand cycle. We do not observe effort ei directly, but we
observe whether the buyer has left a positive review when the job was suc-
cessfully completed. The model predicts that at the end of the high demand
season, sellers who experience a larger demand drop (low Smoothnessi)
are less likely to receive a positive review because they exert less effort.
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